Abstract

A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical justification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence of repeat offenders because of their diminished employment opportunities. We show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consistent.

Submitted: November 1, 2004 · Accepted: January 4, 2005 · Published: April 4, 2005

Recommended Citation

Miceli, Thomas J. and Bucci, Catherine (2005) "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol1/iss1/art5