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AUTHOR:
Guiseppe Di Vita
TITLE:
Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Guiseppe Di Vita
(2006)
"Corruption, Exogenous Changes in Incentives and Deterrence",
German Working Papers in Law and Economics:
Vol. 2006:
Article 17.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art17
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ABSTRACT:
In this article we apply and extend the model elaborated by Acemoglu
and Verdier in their seminal paper (2000), to examine how the
economy represented in their theoretical framework responds to an
exogenous change in the agent’s incentive. In particular, we focus on
the consequences of a famous sentence of the Italian Supreme Court
in plenary session, no. 500 of 1999, in which a revolutionary interpretation
of civil liability rules is introduced, allowing private agents
of our economy to appear before the court to demand reimbursement
for the damages suffered as a consequence of illicit behavior of the
public administration. This is one of the few cases in which the
judex substantially makes law in a system of civil law, and the modi
modification in incentive whether or not to be corrupted comes from an
authority that is not part of the game (the jurisdictional power).
Basing our affirmations on the model, we can say that corruption
may have declined in Italy since the year 2000, as a result of a change
in the incentives for both private agents and bureaucrats.
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