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AUTHOR:
Tina Heubeck
TITLE:
The Collective Selling of Broadcasting Rights in Team Sports
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Tina Heubeck
(2004)
"The Collective Selling of Broadcasting Rights in Team Sports",
German Working Papers in Law and Economics:
Vol. 2004:
Article 13.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2004/iss1/art13
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ABSTRACT:
This paper introduces the theory of complementarities to the selling of
broadcasting rights in team sports in two ways.
Firstly, from a legal point of view such rights should not be centrally
sold by the league or the association in order to comply with antitrust
law because the league as the only seller demands monopoly prices.
However, the problem cannot be solved by simply prohibiting collective
selling. Using a variation of Cournot’s model we show that the price of a
single game is higher if sold individually by the participating clubs
compared to collective selling by the league.
Secondly, as consumers regard games either as complements or as
substitutes, demand for simultaneously played games is
interdependent. We use the solutions employed in deciding about the
pooling of patents to make a general suggestion.
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