A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

This paper analyzes equilibria in sequential take-it-or-leave-it sales when demand is stochastic. It is shown that equilibria in this sales mechanism, unlike in sequential auctions, trade-off allocative efficiency and competing buyers' opportunities to acquire an item to be sold, permitting prices and expected revenue above those of one-shot offers. Hence Coase-type conjectures are invalid in this setting.

Submitted: August 12, 2006 · Accepted: October 12, 2006 · Published: December 4, 2006

Originally published in Topics in Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Beckert, Walter (2006) "Competitive Externalities in Dynamic Monopolies with Stochastic Demand," Topics in Theoretical Economics: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 17.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol6/iss1/art17