Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
A BEJTE Topics article.
Abstract
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.Submitted: August 31, 2004 · Accepted: December 24, 2004 · Published: December 28, 2004
Originally published in Topics in Theoretical Economics.
Recommended Citation
Gill, David and Sgroi, Daniel
(2004)
"Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers,"
Topics in Theoretical Economics:
Vol. 4
:
Iss.
1, Article 11.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/vol4/iss1/art11
