A BEJEAP Contributions article.

Abstract

In a reciprocal market model with imperfectly competitive firms, domestic policies will differ across countries that are economically and politically diverse. We explore the implications of this standard result with regard to harmonization of environmental policies between corrupt and non-corrupt countries. Imposing a more stringent policy on a non-corrupt government will be welfare reducing to the ‘receiving’ country, but may be welfare enhancing for the ‘imposing’ country. However, where environmental standards are under the control of a corrupt government, it is possible that harmonization is welfare enhancing to both countries.

Submitted: March 19, 2004 · Accepted: August 21, 2004 · Published: September 10, 2004

Originally published in Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Hultberg, Patrik T. and Barbier, Edward B. (2004) "Cross-Country Policy Harmonization with Rent-Seeking," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol3/iss2/art4