Nominated by Hungarian Political Science Association

Abstract

The article explores the roots and dynamics of political consensus on EU membership in Hungary. Employing a principal-agent theory of the political process, it emphasises the role of various forms of competition in the healthy functioning of a representative democracy. An informal discussion of the Hungarian case is followed by a game theoretical model of party collusion under circumstances when a new political dimension offers an opportunity for political representatives to weaken electoral control. A key lesson of the empirical findings as well as the formal model is that collusion among political representatives within individual nation states and collusion among states may, under specific circumstances, reinforce each other.

Recommended Citation

Mike, Károly (2007) "An Unhappy Consensus: EU Membership and Party Collusion in Hungary," World Political Science Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 4, Article 1.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-6226.1029
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss4/art1