Nominated by Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política

Abstract

The article challenges the contention that individual amendments are crucial for a system of exchanging favors with the Administration by members of Congress interested in distributive policies as a way of guaranteeing their reelection. By analyzing funds allocated through Congressional amendments, their distribution in different government programs, and roll-call votes in the Brazilian House of Representatives from 1996 to 2001, the authors show that: individual amendments are not prioritized either by Congress in the budget's approval or by the Administration in its implementation; there are no differences between the agenda dictated by the Administration and that of the legislators; and party affiliation explains both House floor votes and the implementation of individual amendments and is thus an explanatory variable in the Executive-Legislative relationship.

Recommended Citation

Limongi, Fernando and Figueiredo, Argelina (2007) "The Budget Process and Legislative Behavior: Individual Amendments, Support for the Executive and Government Programs," World Political Science Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3, Article 3.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-6226.1024
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/wpsr/vol3/iss3/art3