Abstract

In this Article, I elaborate on and defend the following argument: (1) There is no moral luck. (2) If there is no moral luck, there should be no legal luck. (3) Therefore, there should be no legal luck (from (1) and (2)). (4) If there is no normatively significant difference between the law (or the state) doing and allowing, or intending and foreseeing, then there is no normatively significant difference between legal luck and just plain luck that has legal implications. (5) There is no normatively significant difference between the law (or the state) doing and allowing, or intending and foreseeing. (6) Therefore, there is no normatively significant difference between legal luck and just plain luck that has legal implications (from (4) and (5)). (7) Therefore, plain luck should have no legal implications (from (3) and (6)).

Recommended Citation

Enoch, David (2008) "Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice," Theoretical Inquiries in Law: Vol. 9 : No. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol9/iss1/art2

Forum

Ori Simchen, Comment on David Enoch’s Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice (December 2007)

Anat Gelber, Is There a Difference Between Moral Luck and "Plain Luck that Has Moral Implications"? (July 2009)