Abstract

This article takes on the puzzle of why many appellate courts insist on an outright (but simple) majority decision as to the immediate outcome or disposition of a case, while tolerating a plurality decision as to the precedential message, or reasoning, attached to a case. Somewhat similarly, pluralities are respected in many political settings but then not, for example, in legislative assemblies. The argument builds both on the Condorcet Jury Theorem and on the problem of dealing with voting paradoxes, or cycles. It links decision rules with the likelihood of cycling and the danger of misconstruing majority decisions.

Recommended Citation

Levmore, Saul (2002) "Ruling Majorities and Reasoning Pluralities," Theoretical Inquiries in Law: Vol. 3 : No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol3/iss1/art4