Abstract

We develop a model of lawmaking to study the efficiency implications of, and variation in, jurisdictions’ choices between promulgation of indigenously developed laws and legal transplants. Our framework emphasizes the sequential nature of lawmaking, the ubiquity of uncertainty, considerations about ex-ante promulgation versus ex-post adjustment costs, and the importance of the political context of legal reform. In discerning the patterns of inefficiencies in both transplantation and indigenous lawmaking, we elucidate the role of heterogeneity of interests and adaptability of a legal system. We also find that domestic corruption per se need not justify transplantation of foreign legal models. Our results support the view that local conditions are a crucial determinant of the appropriate path of institutional reform.

Submitted: July 11, 2009 · Accepted: July 21, 2009 · Published: November 2, 2009

Recommended Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina (2009) "The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law," Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1, Article 26.
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1402
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol5/iss1/art26