Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction
Abstract
This paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one when information acquisition is easy.Submitted: December 15, 2006 · Accepted: October 23, 2007 · Published: February 27, 2008
Recommended Citation
At, Christian and Chappe, Nathalie
(2008)
"Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction,"
Review of Law & Economics:
Vol. 4
:
Iss.
1, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol4/iss1/art3
