Abstract

Sequential innovation with actual patent infringement and uncertainty in litigation is analyzed. Comparative statics shows that within a wide range of model parameters, a basic researcher holding a patent is able to extract all of the profit facilitated by the basic innovation. The patent holder achieves this by offering a licensing contract which the subsequent innovator accepts in the shadow of paying infringement damages. It is further demonstrated that, under rather general circumstances, broader patent breadth may diminish the patent holder’s incentive to innovate: that is to extract all of the profit from the subsequent innovator commercializing the innovation.

Submitted: January 8, 2007 · Accepted: July 4, 2007 · Published: December 27, 2007

Recommended Citation

Chou, Teyu and Haller, Hans (2007) "The Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation for Probabilistic Patents," Review of Law & Economics: Vol. 3 : Iss. 2, Article 14.
DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1164
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol3/iss2/art14