FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 2, 2005

Berkeley Electronic Press Announces Winners of Major Awards for Economists: Arrow Junior and Arrow Senior Prizes

The Berkeley Electronic Press is pleased to announce the recipient of this year's Kenneth Arrow Prize for Senior Economists:

Kenneth Burdett, Ryoichi Imai, and Randall Wright (2004) "Unstable Relationships", Frontiers of Macroeconomics: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 1. http://www.bepress.com/bejm/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1

Abstract:

We analyze models where agents search for partners to form relationships (employment, marriage, etc.), and may or may not continue searching for different partners while matched. Matched agents are less inclined to search if their match yields more utility, and also if it is more stable. If one partner searches the relationship is less stable, so the other is more inclined to search, potentially making instability a self-fulfilling prophecy. We show this can generate multiple -- indeed, a continuum of -- equilibria. We investigate efficiency and show that in any equilibrium there tends to be too much turnover, unemployment, and inequality. We calibrate an example to see how well the model can account for job-to-job transitions, and to see how much endogenous instability matters.

In addition, The Berkeley Electronic Press is pleased to announce the recipient of this year's Kenneth Arrow Prize for Junior Economists:

Marco Battaglini (2004) "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts", Advances in Theoretical Economics: Vol. 4: No. 1, Article 1. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol4/iss1/art1

Abstract:

We study policy advice by several experts with noisy private information and biased preferences. We highlight a trade-off between the truthfulness of the information revealed by each expert and the number of signals from different experts that can be aggregated to reduce noise. Contrary to models with perfectly informed experts, because of this trade-off, full revelation of information is never possible. However, almost fully efficient information extraction can be obtained in two cases. First, there is an equilibrium in which the outcome converges to the first best benchmark with no asymmetric information as we increase the precision the experts' signals. Second, the inefficiency in communication also converges to zero as the number of experts increases, even when the residual noise in the experts' private signals is large and all the experts have significant and similar (but not necessarily identical) biases.

One paper published in the Berkeley Electronic Press economics journals (see www.bepress.com/alljournals.html for a complete list) by a junior faculty member, or an economist six or fewer years from the Ph.D., is selected annually as the Arrow Junior Prize winner for making an outstanding contribution to economics. Similarly, the Arrow Senior Prize is awarded to one paper published in the Berkeley Electronic Press economics journals by a professor with tenure or an economist who does not have tenure or a tenure track job, but who received their Ph.D. at least 6 years ago. All papers published over the course of the year are automatically eligible. The award winners receive an honorarium and recognition in the form of this email announcement to their peers. This year's selection committee was headed by Don Fullerton, University of Texas, joined by John Leahy, New York University, and Joel Watson, University of California San Diego.

Reminder

In order to reward excellent scholarship, The Berkeley Electronic Press is pleased to offer three new prizes: the Kenneth J. Arrow Prizes in Theoretical Economics, Macroeconomics, and Economic Analysis & Policy. There will be three of each of these prizes awarded for a total of nine prizes. Each recipient will receive $5,000. To be eligible, articles must be submitted to one of the three families of B.E. Journals after January 1, 2005 and published in the Frontiers level. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, Frontiers of Macroeconomics and Frontiers of Economic Analysis & Policy are among the most exclusive journals in economics. They publish only articles that could appear in a top 5 economics journal. Currently their acceptance rates are all less than 1% of submissions. For additional details, see: www.bepress.com/press011205.html

About The Berkeley Electronic Press

Founded by academics in 1999, The Berkeley Electronic Press ("bepress") is both a publisher of peer-reviewed electronic journals and a software developer, having created the institutional repository platform that powers Digital Commons as well as the University of California's eScholarship Repository. The Company produces tools to improve scholarly communication via innovative and effective means of content production and dissemination. Bepress has a portfolio of products and services that reduces the costs of and barriers to access.

For additional information on bepress, please see: www.bepress.com.