Abstract

Terrorist attacks may involve large-scale systems with multiple points of vulnerability and intervention. For example, chemical and biological terrorist attacks can be targeted at large-scale distribution system, such as those associated with agriculture, meat products, or water. These supply-chain systems can be thought of as having three distinct points of potential contamination: at the source, during processing, or at delivery. Prevention and mitigation strategies can be applied at any of these points. The effectiveness of a risk management program involves the ability to evaluate the trade-offs associated with allocating available resources to mitigation strategies that could be implemented at various points along the supply chain.

The paper presents a conceptual model for evaluation the cost-effectiveness of these strategies. Structured as an event tree representing potential contamination entry points at various places in the supply chain, decisions related to where and how resources should be allocated to deterrence, detection and response can be evaluated. This approach focuses on the likelihood of the success of the homeland's actions, rather than on the probability of the terrorists' actions, which can be more difficult to quantify.

Recommended Citation

Spradley, Leah; Abkowitz, Mark; and Clarke, James (2006) "A Risk Assessment Methodology for Intentional Chemical and Biological Contamination of Distribution Systems," Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/jhsem/vol3/iss3/2