Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis

Skills of the Trade: The Tufts Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry

Teja Thorat et al. — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 09:52:44 PST

The Tufts Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) Registry (www.cearegistry.org) is a publicly available comprehensive database of cost-utility analyses of health interventions published in the peer-reviewed medical and public health literature. This article discusses the database structure, methodology of data extraction, current trends in cost-utility analyses and impact of the Registry.

Toward Standardization of Benefit-Cost Analysis of Early Childhood Interventions

Lynn A. Karoly — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 09:52:41 PST

A growing body of benefit-cost analyses (BCAs) of early childhood programs has been prompted by the increased demand for results-based accountability when allocating public and private sector resources. While the BCAs of early childhood programs serve to make such investments more compelling, there are limitations in the current state of the art, including a lack of standardization in the BCA methods used, from discount rates to shadow prices. The objective of this paper is to delineate a set of standards for conducting BCAs of early childhood programs. The paper reviews the existing evidence of the economic returns from early childhood programs that serve children and families in the first five years of life, discusses the challenges that arise in applying the BCA methodology such programs, highlights the variation in current methods used, and proposes a set of standards for applying the BCA methodology to early childhood programs. The recommendations concern issues such as the discount rate to use and the age to which costs and benefits should be discounted; stakeholder disaggregation; outcomes to value, the associated values, and projections of future outcomes; accounting for uncertainty; sensitivity analysis; and reporting of results. The proposed standards can guide the choices that analysts need to make about the methods to use when performing BCAs for one or more early childhood programs and they can support greater transparency in the results the analysts provide. The standards can also support consumers of the BCA results in their need to understand the methods employed and the comparability across different studies.

Is Mandatory Project Evaluation Always Appropriate? Dynamic Inconsistencies of Irreversible and Reversible Projects

Tatsuhito Kono et al. — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 09:52:39 PST

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is used to optimize investment in public projects. Indeed, in many countries, BCA is mandatory for provision of most public services. However, once BCA is mandated, residents can strategically alter their behaviors based on a dynamic inconsistency that the BCA-based optimal service level depends on residents’ behaviors. This paper discusses this dynamic inconsistency problem, taking transportation services as an example. We show that the problem may decrease both social welfare and the utility of residents as compared with the first-best case, and that the occurrence of second-best outcomes depends on the reversibility of the project and the general-equilibrium interdependency with another project.

Indirect Effects in Cost-Benefit Analysis

Jan Rouwendal — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 09:52:37 PST

The debate about the effectiveness of investments in public infrastructure initiated by Aschauer suggests that there may be substantial discrepancies between the results of conventional cost-benefit analysis and the ultimate effects of such investments on welfare. This paper takes a closer look at this issue by investigating the existence of secondary or indirect effects under conditions of monopolistic competition. We find that such effects will in general exist, and that they are potentially large, but that they can also be negative, depending on the specification of the model. With linear demand curves, indirect effects can be positive, zero or negative, with Dixit-Stiglitz they are always nonnegative and closely related to the taste for diversity, while with the logit model they are always identically zero. Free entry reinforces the positive indirect effects in the Dixit-Stiglitz model, and causes negative indirect effects in the logit model. Given this variety of results, robust empirical measurement of the indirect effects appears to be difficult.

Institutional Safeguards for Cost Benefit Analysis: Lessons from the Chilean National Investment System

Andrés Gómez-Lobo — Wed, 25 Jan 2012 09:52:33 PST

This paper discusses some institutional and procedural designs that can strengthen CBA as a decision making tool within the public sector. Our discussion is based on Chile’s National Public Investment System (SNI) the earliest and most consolidated investment appraisal system in Latin America. The objective of Chile’s SNI is to provide a coherent framework for identifying, coordinating, evaluating and implementing public investments. Chile’s SNI has several interesting institutional characteristics. For example, it standardizes project presentation formats, establishes explicit application and evaluation processes for public funds, provides general as well as sector specific methodological guidelines for CBA of projects and programs, and introduces a system of “checks and balances” by separating the institution that evaluates projects from the institutions promoting projects. Besides describing the system and highlighting the features we believe strengthen the use of project appraisal as a decision making tool. The paper also presents data on the number of projects appraised by sector, the overall results of appraisals and other administrative data, as well as a summary of ex-post studies for a sample of road, rural electricity, education and health projects. Unfortunately, the limited data available and the lack of a proper counterfactual scenario do not allow for strong conclusions to be made regarding the performance of the system. However, the data presented serves as an illustration of the Chilean system and it may be of value to researches in this field as well as to policymakers in other countries wishing to improve their public investment systems.

Calculating the Social Opportunity Cost Discount Rate

David F. Burgess et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:59:47 PDT

Two comments in this issue of the Journal address our recent article in Volume 2, Issue 2. The fundamental issue with both comments is that they confuse the financial rate of return with the opportunity cost rate of return and therefore advocate for an inappropriate basis on which to calculate the government discount rate. That is, both comments confuse the financial cost of funds, or the borrowing rate, with the economic opportunity cost of funds. We hope that this exchange advances the subject by reducing confusion.

Comment on Burgess and Zerbe's “Appropriate Discounting for Benefit-Cost Analysis”

Szabolcs Szekeres — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:49 PDT

This is a comment on a paper by David F. Burgess and Richard O. Zerbe. It derives a different set of conclusions than the cited authors do from the customary premises underlying benefit-cost analysis. It concludes that capital should be shadow priced, and that the appropriate discount rate to use in benefit-cost analysis is the interest rate of the capital market to which the public sector has access. It proposes that a plausible source of the great divergence in approaches to discounting stems from different answers being given to the question of whether present day consumption has a future consumption opportunity cost.

Comment on Burgess and Zerbe: On Bank Market Power and the Social Discount Rate

Per-Olov Johansson et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:46 PDT

In this note we discuss how to estimate the social discount rate when banks have market power. Some data from Sweden are used to illustrate the approach. If other investments are crowded out, the implied social discount rate is around 7 percent, i.e. more or less equal to the one suggested by Burgess and Zerbe (2011) for the U.S. but similar to those often used in the EU (3-4 percent) if private consumption is crowded out by the considered investment.

Towards Principles and Standards for the Benefit-Cost Analysis of Safety

Scott Farrow et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:41 PDT

Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) is frequently applied to decisions involving public safety which requires analyzing risk and assessing options to manage risks. Principles and standards may assist analysts, decision-makers, and the public in developing and interpreting such BCAs. Principles and standards at best represent commonly held views among a community of practice. Such views are continually evolving with advances in the field. This paper presents a modularized format towards principles and standards that may assist in focusing discussion and decisions about whether such proposals actually reflect principles and standards within the benefit-cost analysis community of practice. Among topics covered are welfare measures, benefit or cost transfer, and valuing uncertain outcomes.

Valuing the Benefit for Cancer Patients of Receiving Blood Transfusions at Home

Nathalie Havet et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:34 PDT

In the field of health care management, contingent valuation surveys (CV) are used in cost benefit analyses (CBA) to elicit patients’ monetary valuation of program benefits. We considered the empirical situation of blood transfusions (BT) in cancer patients. Before planning such a CBA, we had to make sure that the CV approach could be used in a particularly critical clinical situation to estimate the marginal benefit of changing from hospital BT to home BT. The fact that the CV approach is feasible and acceptable to severely ill patients was not taken for granted a priori.

We measured patient’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for home BT in a sample of 139 patients who received transfusions either at home or in the hospital. After considering patient’s participation to the survey and protest responses, we identified possible determinants of WTP values derived from previous knowledge, then we compared their expected influences to predicted influences resulting from econometric analysis to assess the validity of our results. Participation was high (90%) and few patients gave protest responses. Most patients (65%) had received home care, including 43% BT. The median WTP for home BT was 26.5 € per patient.

Good consistency was observed between the expected and predicted influences of possible determinants of WTP. The anchoring bias hypothesis was confirmed. The WTP for home BT increased with previous experience of home care, age, living far from the hospital and low quality of life. Our CV approach is thus a first contribution to the debate on the appropriateness of generalizing access to home BT. However, our results would be worth confirming with a formal cost-benefit analysis.

Benefit-Cost Analysis with Local Residents’ Stated Preference Information: A Study of Non-Motorized Transport Investments in Pune, India

Hua Wang et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:28 PDT

One of the major difficulties in doing benefit-cost analyses of a development project is to estimate a total economic value of the project benefits, which are usually multi-dimensional and include goods and services that are not traded in the market, and challenges also arise in aggregating the values of different benefits, which may not be mutually exclusive. This paper presents an analysis of a non-motorized transport project in Pune, India, which uses the contingent valuation method to estimate the total value of the project benefits across beneficiaries. A sample of the project beneficiaries are presented with a detailed description of the project and then are asked to vote on whether such a project should be undertaken given different specifications of costs to their households. A function of willingness-to-pay for the project is then derived from the survey answers and the key determinants are found to include household income, distance to the project streets, current use of the transportation modes, future use of the project streets, predicted impacts of the project, and level of trust in the government. The total willingness-to-pay of the local residents is found to be smaller than the total cost of an initial design of the project. Heteroskedasticity is also found to present in the willingness-to-pay models.

The Combination of Lab and Field Experiments for Benefit-Cost Analysis

Stéphan Marette et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:22 PDT

This article explores the combination of laboratory and field experiments in defining a welfare framework and the impact of different regulatory tools on consumer behaviors. First, an overview of strengths and weaknesses raised by the experimental literature show that, for food consumption, lab and field experiments may be complementary to each other. The lab experiment elicits willingness to pay useful for determining per-unit damages based on well-informed, thoughtful preferences, while the field experiment determines purchase/consumption reactions in real contexts. Second, the analytical approach suggests how to combine the results of both lab and field experiments to determine the welfare impact of different regulatory tools such as labels and/or taxes. Third, an empirical application focuses on a lab and a field experiment conducted in France to evaluate the impact of regulation on fish consumption. Estimations for the French tuna market show that a per-unit tax on tuna and/or an advisory policy lead to welfare improvements.

Risk Heterogeneity and the Value of Reducing Fatal Risks: Further Market-Based Evidence

Ikuho Kochi et al. — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 12:51:16 PDT

The benefits associated with mortality risk reductions are a critical input for the benefit-cost analysis of economically significant federal regulations that affect health and safety. The dominant method of estimating the benefits of reducing mortality risks relies on labor markets to estimate the tradeoffs between workers’ wages and occupational risk. The past literature considers all labor market risks to be equivalent, failing to recognize the inherent heterogeneity in occupational hazards. In this research, heterogeneity in the value of reducing risks is explored within the labor market context. Unique location-specific risk data are developed for over 300 U.S. cities to separately identify the wage premiums for facing two disparate occupational risks: violent assault and motor vehicle accident risks. We find that ignoring the underlying heterogeneity in risks can lead to substantial over/under-statements of the benefits of reducing any one particular risk by up to 350%. As such, caution is urged for benefits transfer exercises that apply estimates of the marginal willingness to pay for reducing labor market accident risks to policies affecting very different risks, such as public safety or environmental risks.

Labor Expenditures and Benefit-Cost Accounting in Times of Unemployment

Robert H. Haveman et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:17:01 PDT

We summarize procedures for assessing the benefits and costs of using labor inputs in public projects. Examples are provided to illustrate how information on labor inputs can be analyzed and presented such that, should the analyst choose, labor services generate elements of both benefit and cost in times of high unemployment; however, this is not generally correct in times of full employment. Our analysis is consistent with the overall goal of identifying those projects which are estimated to improve efficiency—those with social benefits in excess of social costs.

The Treatment of Uncertainty in EPA's Analysis of Air Pollution Rules: A Status Report

Arthur G. Fraas — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:58 PDT

An understanding of the uncertainty in benefit and cost estimates is a critical part of a benefit–cost analysis. Without a quantitative treatment of uncertainty, it is difficult to know how much confidence to place in the benefit–cost estimates associated with regulatory analysis. In 2002, an NRC report recommended that EPA move toward conducting probabilistic, multiple-source uncertainty analyses in its RIAs with the specification of probability distributions for major sources of uncertainty in the benefit estimates. In 2006, reports by GAO and RFF found that EPA had begun to address the NRC recommendations, but that much remained to be done to meet the NRC concerns. This paper provides a further review of EPA’s progress in developing a quantitative assessment of the uncertainties in its health benefits analyses for the RIAs for four recent rulemakings setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). In conclusion, EPA’s basic approach to presenting the uncertainty in its health benefits estimates remains largely unchanged. Recent RIAs present the results of uncertainty analysis in piecemeal fashion rather than providing an overall, comprehensive statement of the uncertainty in the estimates. In addition, the uncertainty analysis in recent RIAs continues to focus on the concentration-response relationship and largely fails to address the uncertainty associated with the other key elements of the benefits analysis.

Behavioral Economics and the Conduct of Benefit-Cost Analysis: Towards Principles and Standards

Lisa A. Robinson et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:55 PDT

As traditionally conducted, benefit-cost analysis is rooted in neoclassical welfare economics, which, in its most simplified form, assumes that individuals act rationally and are primarily motivated by self-interest, making decisions that maximize their welfare. Its conduct is evolving to reflect recent work in behavioral economics, which explores the psychological aspects of decisionmaking. We consider several implications for analyses of social programs, focusing largely on economic valuation. First, benefit-cost analysis often involves valuing nonmarket outcomes such as reductions in health and environmental risks. Behavioral research emphasizes the need to recognize that these values are affected by psychological as well as physical attributes. Second, benefit-cost analysis traditionally uses exponential discounting to reflect time preferences, while behavioral research suggests that individuals’ discounting may be hyperbolic. While the appropriate rates and functional form are uncertain, market rates best represent the opportunity costs associated with diverting funds to support a particular social policy or program. Such rates reflect the intersection between technological progress and individual preferences, regardless of whether these preferences fit the standard economic model or a behavioral alternative. Third, behavioral research emphasizes the need to consider the influence of other-regarding preferences on valuation. In addition to acting altruistically, individuals may act reciprocally to reward or punish others, or use the status of others as the baseline against which to assess their own well-being. Fourth, behavioral economics identifies factors that can help researchers develop valuation studies that provide well-informed, thoughtful preferences. Finally, while behavioral research has led some to argue for a more paternalistic approach to policy analysis, an alternative is to continue to focus on describing the preferences of those affected by the policy options while working to ensure that these preferences are based on knowledge and careful reflection. Benefit-cost analysis can be best viewed as a pragmatic framework for collecting, organizing, and evaluating relevant information.

Private Valuation of a Public Good in Three Auction Mechanisms

Arnaud Z. Dragicevic et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:52 PDT

We evaluate the impact of three auction mechanisms—the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism, the second-price auction (SPA), and the random nth-price auction (NPA)—in the measurement of private willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept for a pure public good. Our results show that the endowment effect is lower with the BDM mechanism. In this market mechanism, the effect disappears after a few repetitions. Yet, on a logarithmic scale, the random nth-price auction yields the highest speed of convergence towards equality of welfare indices. We also observe that subjects value public goods in reference to their private subjective benefit derived from their public funding.

Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent

Jérôme Danguy et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:49 PDT

For more than 40 years, governments and professional associations have acted, voted or lobbied against the implementation of the Community Patent (COMPAT, officially called the EU Patent). The econometric results and simulations presented in this paper suggest that, thanks to its attractiveness in terms of market size and a sound renewal fee structure, the COMPAT would drastically reduce the relative patenting costs for applicants while generating more income for the European Patent Office and most National Patent Offices. The loss of economic rents (€400 million would be lost by patent attorneys, translators and lawyers) and the drop of controlling power by national patent offices elucidate further the observed resistance to the Community Patent.

Appropriate Discounting for Benefit-Cost Analysis

David F. Burgess et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:46 PDT

In order to be sensible about what discount rate to use one must be clear about its purpose. We suggest that its purpose is to help select those projects that will contribute more net benefits than some other discount rate. This approach, which is after all the foundation for benefit-cost analysis, helps to reconcile different suggested procedures for determining the discount rate. We suggest that the social opportunity cost of capital (SOC) is superior to other suggested approaches in its generality and its ease of use. We use the SOC to determine a range of real rates that vary between 6% and 8%. We suggest that approaches based on determination of preferences, which result in hyperbolic discounting, are less appropriate and less useful.

Characterizing the Amount and Speed of Discounting Procedures

Dean T. Jamison et al. — Mon, 25 Apr 2011 16:16:42 PDT

This paper introduces the concepts of amount and speed of a discounting procedure in order to generate well-characterized families of procedures for use in social project evaluation. Exponential discounting sequesters the concepts of amount and speed into a single parameter that needs to be disaggregated in order to characterize nonconstant rate procedures. The inverse of the present value of a unit stream of benefits provides a natural measure of the amount a procedure discounts the future. We propose geometrical and time horizon based measures of how rapidly a discounting procedure acquires its ultimate present value, and we prove these to be the same. This provides an unambiguous measure of the speed of discounting, a measure whose values lie between 0 (slow) and 2 (fast). Exponential discounting has a speed of 1. A commonly proposed approach to aggregating individual discounting procedures into a social one for project evaluation averages the individual discount functions. We point to serious shortcoming with this approach and propose an alternative for which the amount and time horizon of the social procedure are the averages of the amounts and time horizons of the individual procedures. We further show that the social procedure will in general be slower than the average of the speeds of the individual procedures. For potential applications in social project evaluation we characterize three families of two-parameter discounting procedures – hyperbolic, gamma, and Weibull – in terms of their discount functions, their discount rate functions, their amounts, their speeds and their time horizons. (The appendix characterizes additional families, including the quasi-hyperbolic one.) A one parameter version of hyperbolic discounting, d(t) = (1+rt)^-2, has amount r and speed 0, and this procedure is our candidate for use in social project evaluation, although additional empirical work will be needed to fully justify a one-parameter simplification of more general procedures.