Abstract

The article explores Aristotle's view that the function of rhetoric is "not to persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case."

The article briefly illustrates the implications of adopting Aristotle's descriptive approach for teaching statutory interpretation.

The article then links the normative approach of "dynamic interpretation" with Aristotle's category epideictic rhetoric. The article suggests that the case for dynamic interpretation is strengthened by insights drawn from social science and the civil law tradition and weakened by reliance on hermeneutics.

Professor Eskridge's argument is praised for its emotional and moral force.

The remarkable disparity between the seminal character of the Eskridge article in the academic literature and the absence of citations in case law and Supreme Court briefs is noted. Several hypotheses accounting for this puzzling disparity are discussed.

The article concludes with an attempt to persuade the scholarly community to engage with the legislature and statutory law as instruments for law reform.

Recommended Citation

Michael E. Libonati, "Dynamic Interpretation: The Art of Persuasion" Issues in Legal Scholarship, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (2002): Article 14.
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art14