Abstract

This article starts by offering a more detailed account of how Fiss' argument in favor of the "group-disadvantaging principle" might be brought to bear on the affirmative action debate than the author actually provides, while suggesting that, appearances notwithstanding, his emphasis on group inequality at the level of constitutional theory does not require abandoning the tenets of liberal individualism at the level of moral and political theory. I will then attempt to explore further the institutional reasons why the courts failed to embrace the group-disadvantaging principle, thus linking this failure to two other major developments in past and present Equal Protection jurisprudence: Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson and Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.

Recommended Citation

Daniel Sabbagh, "Affirmative Action and the Group-Disadvantaging Principle" Issues in Legal Scholarship, The Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory (2003): Article 14.
http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art14