The WTO as an institution and the rule based Dispute Settlement Mechanism therein was conceived with a desire to bridge the limitations of the economic divide plaguing nations. However, the insertion of a rule based mechanism was by itself inadequate to achieve its purpose. The mechanism in most parts functioned within traditional bounds of retaliation to ensure compliance. These avenues failed to consider the inability of smaller states to use such measures. It was in the face of these limitations that judicial innovation gave birth to the idea of cross-retaliation through the TRIPs agreement. Theoretically, it addressed most of the limitations of more traditional measures. On a more practical footing however, it was economically unfeasible for retaliating countries to use cross-retaliation. The article analyses why smaller countries invariably find themselves in such a situation when confronted with an option to retaliate. It attempts to provide a solution to this problem by resorting to a creative reading of the TRIPs Agreement. It concludes with an optimistic view of the future of cross-retaliation.