Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild <br> Freedom to compete, per se rules and the rule of reason – Remarks on the institutional-evolutionary concept for competition policy

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German Working Papers in Law and Economics

AUTHOR:
Dieter Schmidtchen

TITLE:
Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild
Freedom to compete, per se rules and the rule of reason – Remarks on the institutional-evolutionary concept for competition policy

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Dieter Schmidtchen (2006) "Wettbewerbsfreiheit, Per se Verbote und die Rule of Reason – Anmerkungen zum institutionenökonomisch-evolutionären Wettbewerbsleitbild
Freedom to compete, per se rules and the rule of reason – Remarks on the institutional-evolutionary concept for competition policy ", German Working Papers in Law and Economics: Vol. 2006: Article 23.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art23

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ABSTRACT:

Recently, Chr. Mantzavinos proposed a new concept for antitrust analysis drawing on theoretical developments in New Institutional Economics and Evolutionary Economics. Criticizing the policy prescriptions based on traditional microeconomics and welfare economics, Mantzavinos pleas for a rule-governed antitrust policy which mainly operates with per se rules. This paper argues that the criticism of the traditional foundations of antitrust is inadequate and that per se rules rarely work. Reality confounds the principle of per se illegality and prompted courts to use a de facto rule of reason.