 |









|
Or search all bepress web pages:
|
|
We welcome your feedback. Please
email your suggestions and ideas to us.
|
|
|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
 |
 |
|
AUTHOR:
Dieter Schmidtchen
TITLE:
Der "more economic approach" in der Wettbewerbspolitik
SUGGESTED CITATION:
Dieter Schmidtchen
(2005)
"Der "more economic approach" in der Wettbewerbspolitik",
German Working Papers in Law and Economics:
Vol. 2005:
Article 6.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2005/iss1/art6
|
|
 |
|
|
ABSTRACT:
This article argues that it is time for antitrust policy to move beyond structural understandings of competition
(“preserving competition”) and into the realm of explicit welfare analysis. A “more economic
approach” should reflect current economic thinking about competition, incentives and efficiency. Competition
is defined in the paper as a process of creating and appropriating value (social surplus). Allocative,
technical and innovative inefficiencies are viewed as fundamentally due to failures of capturing
value. The paper argues that antitrust laws should recognize a defence for all private acts that restrain
“competition” under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare. The proposed efficiency
defense is, however, limited to intra-market second-best tradeoffs, i.e. tradeoffs involving market failures
in the relevant market. The antitrust authorities should accept the defense if, first, the conduct will
not substantially impair the ability of public or private actors subsequently to ameliorate the effects of
the market failure; and if, second, there is no less restrictive alternative consistent with the antitrust
laws that could achieve similar welfare gains. The paper also assesses the costs and benefits of implementing
an intra-market second-best defense and argues that this approach provides better criteria
for a workable antitrust policy than an antitrust standard based on protecting “competition”.
|
|
|
|