Art
bepress.com
Home
My Account
All Journals
Contact Bepress
About Bepress
Subscriptions
Services
Reviews


Search All Publications
Find

Or search all bepress web pages: Search

We welcome your feedback. Please email your suggestions and ideas to us.
German Working Papers in Law and Economics
cover current_volume all_volumes submit_article

bealert

Volume 2003

AUTHOR:
Ohad Soudry

TITLE:
A Cost-Effective Policy in Competitive Bidding for Public Procurement

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Ohad Soudry (2003) "A Cost-Effective Policy in Competitive Bidding for Public Procurement", German Working Papers in Law and Economics: Vol. 2003: Article 7.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2003/iss1/art7


View the article (206 KB)
Notify a colleague about this paper
Get Acrobat Reader
Printing Tip: Select the option to 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog to ensure the article prints as it appears on screen.
Learn more...

ABSTRACT:

Recently, calls to acknowledge efficiency in E.C. public procurement law, have lead to the finding that strict anti-discrimination and transparency measures might interfere with pursuing such a purpose. This paper focuses on such efficiency considerations and presents a law and economics analysis of competitive bidding by using basic economic tools to examine social-costs aspects of competition in public procurement procedures. It is suggested that whenever quality criteria are considered by the public entity, the number of bidders should be restricted according to two measures: 1) variable costs, which increase with the number of participants and are borne by the public entity, and 2) private incentives of bidders to win gains of prestige and reputation that induce them to enter the competition for public contracts. The conclusion of this paper is that policies to restrict the number of bidders are recommended and a method to determine the optimal number of bidders in restricted procedures is therefore proposed.




| HOME | MY ACCOUNT | TERMS OF SERVICE | COPYRIGHT | PRIVACY |
Copyright ©1999-2014 Berkeley Electronic Press™ All rights reserved.