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ABSTRACT:
The paper discusses the ex-ante- and ex-post-incentives that result from different insolvency law arrangements. It concentrates on the problem how to evaluate and utilise the debtor’s seizable assets after bankruptcy proceedings are commenced. This is closely related to the problem of creditor co-ordination. We compare the proceedings according to the new German insolvency law to some reform proposals suggested in the literature such as the auctions approach by Roe, the options approaches by Bebchuk and by Aghion/Hart/Moore as well as the possibility of a structured out-of-court settlement favoured by Eidenmüller. Especially the option approach seems to solve the evaluation and co-ordination problem at low cost. |
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