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German Working Papers in Law and Economics
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Volume 2001

AUTHOR:
Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen

TITLE:
Voting Rules in Insolvency Law: A Simple-Game Theoretic Approach

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Matthew Braham and Frank Steffen (2001) "Voting Rules in Insolvency Law: A Simple-Game Theoretic Approach", German Working Papers in Law and Economics: Vol. 2001: Article 19.
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2001/iss1/art19


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ABSTRACT:

A chief characteristic of modern insolvency law in the Canada, Germany, the UK, and the US is its provision for ‘workouts’ or ‘schemes of arrangement’ by which insolvent companies can attempt to rehabilitate the business. If reorganization is chosen, the debtor has to devise a plan of action which will be voted upon by claimants. The voting rules, however, differ in each jurisdiction to a greater or lesser extent and as yet have not been analysed in any rigorous manner. This paper provides an approach based upon the theory of simple games to analyse the rules in terms of the ease which each of these regimes can pass (or hinder) plans and how these rules distribute value among claimants. We pay particular attention to the role of classification and the effect of coalition formation.




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