Hospital Quality and Selective Contracting: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation

David H. Howard, Emory University

Abstract

Most private health insurers offer a limited network of providers to enrollees. Critics have questioned whether selective contracting benefits patients. Plans counter that they take quality into account when choosing providers. Using data on five plans' networks for kidney transplant hospitals, this study shows that in-network hospitals have better outcomes than out-of-network facilities. Conditional logit estimates using patient level data confirm this result: compared to Medicare patients, privately-insured patients are more likely to register at hospitals with higher survival rates. Restricting choice has the potential to improve patient welfare if plans steer uninformed patients to high quality hospitals and physicians.

Recommended Citation

David H. Howard (2008) "Hospital Quality and Selective Contracting: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation," Forum for Health Economics & Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 2 (Economics of Health Care Contracting), Article 2.
http://www.bepress.com/fhep/11/2/2

 
 
 
 

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