Advance Disclosure of Managers' Stock Trades: A Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation

Jesse Fried, University of California, Berkeley

Summary

Despite the insider trading laws and Sarbanes-Oxley, Jesse Fried argues that executives still make billions of dollars of insider trading profits each year by timing their stock sales: requiring advance disclosure of such trades would go far to address this problem.

Recommended Citation

Fried, Jesse (2006) "Advance Disclosure of Managers' Stock Trades: A Proposal to Improve Executive Compensation," The Economists' Voice: Vol. 3 : Iss. 8, Article 7.
DOI: 10.2202/1553-3832.1165
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss8/art7

 
 
 
 

ISSN: 1553-3832 ©1999-2009 The Berkeley Electronic Press™ All rights reserved.

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