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Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games Abigail Barr, CSAE, University of Oxford et al Download the Paper (PDF format) - February 1, 2009 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: Data from three bargaining games—the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game—played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling. SUGGESTED CITATION: Abigail Barr and et al, "Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games" (February 1, 2009). The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series. Working Paper 316. http://www.bepress.com/csae/paper316