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The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment Abigail Barr, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford Danila Serra, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford Download the Paper (PDF format) - August 1, 2008 Tell a colleague about it. Printing Tips: Select 'print as image' in the Acrobat print dialog if you have trouble printing. ABSTRACT: Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, suggesting that the issue of artificiality first raised by Bardsley (2005) may be of particular importance in bribery experiments. SUGGESTED CITATION: Abigail Barr and Danila Serra, "The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment" (August 1, 2008). The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series. Working Paper 304. http://www.bepress.com/csae/paper304