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Environmental Participation and
Environmental Motivation

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Abstract

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Environmental Participation and Environmental Motivation

Summary

We explore whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior by focusing on volunteering. The paper first introduces a theoretical model of volunteering in environmental organizations. In a next step, it tests the hypothesis working with a large micro data set covering 32 countries from both Western and Eastern Europe using several different proxies to measure environmental motivation. Our results indicate that environmental motivation has a strong impact on individuals' voluntary engagement in environmental organizations. A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher environmental moral standards may lead to a stronger voluntary involvement in environmental organizations.

Keywords: Environmental Participation, Environmental Motivation, Environmental Morale, Pro-environmental Attitudes, Social Capital

JEL Classification: D11, H41, H26, H73, D64

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I. INTRODUCTION

Why is it that a growing number of studies are devoted to examining individual environmental preferences, proposing for example, that individuals' environmental morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with public goods (see, for example Frey and Stutzer, 2006)? One motivation for such a suggestion is that control and deterrence models predict a level of compliance far lower than that actually observed. In many countries, the level of government control is too low to explain the high degree of environmental compliance. For example, it is common practice for the majority of park visitors to carefully collect and wrap their refuse before purposely driving to the bin and disposing of it. This action incurs a personal cost that could have been avoided by simply leaving the rubbish behind, considering there is no threat of omnipresent police officers. In an attempt to resolve this puzzle of compliance, researchers have identified social norms and the strength of these norms as an explanation for the high degree of compliance. Similarly, a high level of cooperation can also be found in experiments. According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth (1995), many ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50,50), that the mean offer is somewhere around (40,60), and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be rejected. Moreover, according to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993), public good experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment to a public good. Baldry (1987) identifies a need to revise the theory rather than questioning the experimental method. However, there are few studies exploring empirically whether such pro-environmental

attitudes exert a positive effect on either environmental behavior or involvement in environmental organizations. The presence of such norms or environmental motivation influencing the willingness to contribute to the environment is especially useful in situations where it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange a regulatory enforcement regime. A desirable and positive side effect of voluntary compliance is that it lowers the cost of government operations aimed at ensuring public good provision (Slemrod 2002).

Recent studies in the area of ecological economics have shown that social capital indeed influences transaction costs and also the effectiveness of public environmental policies (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007). These results suggest that “environmental conflicts can be resolved by making collective choices that are implemented by establishing, changing or reaffirming governance institutions” (Paavola and Adger, 2005, p. 364). It has furthermore been shown that the existence of social capital is important when dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the threat of climate change, or for coping with the impact of environmental disasters, such as droughts or floods. The adaptive capability of societies is strongly linked to their ability to act collectively (Adger, 2003).

The strength of this paper lies to explore the impact of environmental motivation on environmental behavior focusing on individuals’ voluntary engagement in environmental organization and to test its impact with the use of a large micro data set covering 32 European countries. Such breadth and depth of data allows for exploration of the different channels through which individuals express their environment motivation through pro-environmental attitudes, and we capitalize on this opportunity by exploring

two variables that measure voluntary environmental participation (i.e. membership and voluntary work).

Section 2 of the paper first discusses the theoretical background and introduces a model of volunteering. Section 3 introduces the data set and the key variables. The empirical findings are presented in Section 4 and some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.

II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Civil engagement in voluntary organizations is gaining increased attention from researchers; nonetheless the causes of environmental participation are still relatively unknown. The benefit of participation in voluntary activities is the creation of social output that would per se require paid resources (Freeman, 1997). Pretty and Ward (2001) showed that the creation of active pro-environmental groups was significant for solving certain local environmental problems¹. Our study will not only explore the gender, age and parental effect, but will also show who is likely to participate and whose priorities and values are best promoted by voluntary work in environmental organizations. However, to date only a few studies have analyzed the factors impacting on the participation in environmental organizations (Mohai, 1992; Thompson and Barton, 1994; Martinez and McMullin, 2004). The advantage of focusing on direct participation in environmental organizations is that individuals' behavior can be measured. Moreover, it

¹ Those authors analyzed some environmental organizations in rural communities. They found an evolution from reactive-dependence groups (static and created exclusively in reaction to a threat or a crisis), towards awareness-interdependence groups (more dynamic and interactive).

builds a bridge between the social capital literature that focuses on volunteering and the environmental literature on pro-environmental preferences.

The relevance of going beyond a neoclassical approach to understanding the reasons why citizens comply is demonstrated in the tax compliance literature and the analyses of tax paying behavior. Deterrence mechanisms alone cannot explain the level of observed compliance in this regard, (Torgler 2007). Similarly, the level of formal deterrence is too low to explain why, for example, people do not litter more often. Social norms help to resolve such a puzzle, but more empirical evidence is required to determine whether environmental attitudes affect environmental actions, although previous literature has shown that values and attitudes can affect individual behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Lewis, 1982). Thus, it is useful to explore whether the decision to participate in environmental organizations is driven by a set of attitudes and norms. Our theoretical model is strongly influenced by previous studies on altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and moral motivation in a public good environment (Brekke et al. 2003).

A set of social norms that place a higher value on the environment increases the moral costs of not making a significant contribution to environmental quality. This may influence the decision to become active in an environmental organization. It is therefore a relevant issue to investigate whether differences in environmental attitudes across individuals and countries are reflected in any differences in real or observed behaviors. Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual cooperation in public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation of social norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell

(2000) point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms have on individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws.

What is the meaning of ‘pro-environmental behavior’? Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) define it as actions taken by an individual in consciously seeking to minimize the negative impact of human activities on the environment and Jensen (2002) refers to those personal actions that are directly related to environmental improvements. Some daily activities, such as minimizing resource and energy consumption, reducing and recycling waste, or using public transport are private actions which contribute to the preservation of nature. In the same way, participation in environmental organizations can be seen as a kind of pro-environmental behavior and is highly relevant in ensuring the efficacy of environmental policies which require behavioral changes. When considered from an economic perspective, this behavior “exemplifies an individual’s voluntary effort to provide an environmental public good” (Clark et al. 2003, p. 238). Why do people take actions which result in collective benefits? While the traditional theoretical models predict a free-rider effect in the private provision of public goods, in practice the observed levels of provision are higher than anticipated (Andreoni, 1988; Piliavin and Charng, 1990). Andreoni (1990, p. 465) provides an important model of impure altruism to understand donations to public goods. He assumes an economy with only one private good and one public good. The individual utility donation function depends on the consumption of a private good (x_i), the total amount of a public good (G), and the individual’s gift to the public good (g_i). Thus, $U_i = U(x_i, G, g_i)$. This allows to differentiate two cases, namely a purely altruistic situation $U(x_i, G_i)$ when the individual

cares nothing for the private gift, and $U(x_i, g_i)$ when the individual is motivated to give only by warm-glow (purely egoistic). The cases in between are defined as an impurely altruistic behavior. However, he acknowledges that there are important alternative approaches to such an impure altruism model, namely moral or group-interested behavior. In line with such a suggestion, Brekke et al. (2003) implement moral motivation in their model by working with a social welfare function to determine the morally ideal effort, where individuals share a utilitarian moral philosophy. For simplicity, they assume that the labor supply and the income are exogenously fixed. In a next step, individuals maximize their utility in a benefit-cost environment, trading the benefits of maintaining a self-image as socially responsible individuals against the costs. Improving the self-image induces an effort improvement towards beliefs that are perceived to be morally right.

We now introduce our model. We assume that individual's utility function is given by

$$U_i = U(x_i, l_i, G, \lambda_i) \tag{1}$$

where x_i is individual i 's consumption of private goods, l_i leisure, G is the public good of increasing environmental quality, and λ_i the utility from participating voluntarily in an environmental organization.

Voluntary work is time consuming and subject to opportunity costs. Thus, v_i represent the hours spent for voluntary work in an environmental organization. Individuals' consumption can therefore be written as an income constraint, defined by the

product of the wage rate w and the working hours $T - l_i - v_i \geq 0$, where T is the time constraint (available time):

$$x_i = w_i(T - l_i - v_i) \quad (2)$$

The total amount of public good (environmental quality) depends on the public provision G_p and private provision $\sum_i g_i$, assuming identical individuals N :

$$G = G_p + \sum_i g_i \quad (3)$$

where

$$g_i = \alpha v_i \quad (4)$$

is individual i 's production function that depends on the level of voluntary participation in an environmental organization and an efficiency parameter α . Since we have identical individuals $\sum_i g_i$ is equal to Ng_i . Therefore, we can write:

$$G = G_p + N\alpha v_i \quad (5)$$

The utility from participating in a voluntary environmental organization (λ_i) has the following form:

$$\lambda_i = \ln\left(\frac{v_i}{m_i}\right) \quad (6)$$

where m_i is a factor that measures an individual's motivation to contribute to the environment ($m_i \geq 0$). It measures what the individual believes to be the morally minimum environmental involvement. It should be noted that λ_i can also become negative if the individual is not able to reach this morally minimum level ($m_i > v_i$). This would induce a feeling of guilt and shame rather than a psychic gain when $v_i > m_i$.

We also assume that the utility function is additively separable in x_i, l_i, G , and λ_i . The utility function thus becomes:

$$U_i = x_i + l_i + G + \lambda_i \quad (7)$$

Considering (2) to (6) leads to the following utility function:

$$U_i = w_i(T - l_i - v_i) + l_i + (G_p + N\alpha v_i) + \ln\left(\frac{v_i}{m_i}\right) \quad (8)$$

An individual maximizes utility (8) subject to her voluntary involvement in an environmental organization (v_i). Setting the first order condition $U_i' = \frac{\partial U_i}{\partial v_i}$ equal to 0

leads to the following condition for the optimal effort engagement:

$$v_i = \frac{m_i}{w_i - N\alpha} \quad (9)$$

Eq. (9) suggests that environmental participation will increase with an increase in individual's perceived morally minimum environmental involvement. Thus, we can develop the following main hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher environmental moral standards leads to a stronger voluntary involvement in environmental organizations.

Moreover, Eq. (9) also indicates that an increase in the wage rate changes the allocation of time. An increase leads to a decline of voluntary work in environmental organizations. However, such a negative effect is reduced with a higher level of efficiency in the contribution of the private provision of the public good, α multiplied by the number of individuals in the society. It should be noted that we have implemented a consumer model. One may argue that individuals are also volunteering to accumulate human capital with the intention of increasing future income through the acquisition of certain types of skills and through creating and developing networks that enhance their human capital (Hackl et al., 2007). This would require the use of an investment model with a dynamic structure. However, we believe that our consumer model is very useful when exploring moral values.

III. DATA

We use two variables that measure involvement in a voluntary environmental organization, namely membership and doing unpaid work:

Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for: conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (1=yes, 0 otherwise).

Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong: conservation, the environment, ecology, animal rights (1=mentioned, 0= not mentioned).

To ensure the robustness of results, we use several dependent variables that can be seen as a proxy m , namely the motivation to contribute to the environment. The first two variables measure m in the following way:

I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree)

I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree)

Although we are not conducting a contingent valuation study (CV), these two questions offer the chance to explore our parameter m . However, the question is not free of problems and can be criticized in several ways. The statement is relatively vague: “environmental pollution” is not clearly specified, and neither is the level of

improvement. Similarly, the degree of income to be spent and the tax increase are not clarified. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they would hypothetically have to contribute². The consequences of taxation are not mentioned and no information is provided regarding the extent to which income tax, value added tax or other taxes are supposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will bear the highest tax burden. Such unspecified payment schemes questions will increase the variance in responses, but on the other hand, may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001). Nevertheless, despite these possible shortcomings, an unspecified statement still helps to measure moral values and to reduce strategic behavior via influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods. A more concrete scenario could encourage respondents to intentionally indicate false willingness to contribute values in order to match their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005). When neither specific goods nor quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question do not have to be thoroughly explained to be sure that respondents understand and respond with the appropriate willingness to spend income and accept an increase in taxes³.

In a next step we will explore a variable that measures environmental attitudes, but takes into account the possibility that people may have an incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). We would predict that such a variable would lead to contradictory results (compared to the previous two variables):

² It has been shown that the preferences to protect the environment (regarding causes and consequences of environmental damages) depend on the level of information included in the questionnaire (Bulte et al., 2005).

³ For a detailed discussion regarding possible survey biases see Carson and Mitchell (1995).

The Government has to reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me any money (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree)

Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables, which are explained in the Appendix. Previous research in environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the relevance of considering such socio-demographic factors, formal and informal education and participation in an environmental organization (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007). We also differentiate between the two regions of Europe (i.e. Western and Eastern Europe) to account for effects of the reform process in the transition countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to large social costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing poverty and poor institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high transaction costs. Torgler (2003) and Alm et al. (2006) show that such circumstances have an impact on social norms.

IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

This paper uses survey data provided by the European Values Survey (EVS) 1999/2000, which is a European-wide investigation of socio-cultural and political change. The survey collects data on the basic values and beliefs of people throughout Europe. The EVS was first carried out from 1981 to 1983, then in 1990 to 1991 and again in 1999 through 2001, with an increasing number of countries participating over time. The methodological

approach is explained in detail in the European Values Survey (1999) source book, which provides information on response rates, the stages of sampling procedures, the translation of the questionnaire, and field work, along with measures of coding consistency, reliability of data, and data checks. All country surveys are conducted by experienced professional survey organizations, with the exception of Greece. Interviews are face-to-face and those interviewed are adult citizens aged 18 years and older. Tilburg University coordinates the project and provides the guidelines to guarantee the use of standardized information in the surveys and the national representativeness of the data. To avoid framing biases, the questions are asked in a prescribed order. The response rates vary from country to country with an average response rate of around 60 percent.

Because EVS poses an identical set of questions to individuals in various European countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine our hypotheses. We are able to employ a large data set considering 32 representative national samples. EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing the danger of framing effects when compared with many other surveys that focus entirely on environmental questions. A further advantage of using this extensive data set is the ability to explore a large number of dependent variables.

Economists are increasingly using survey data in such areas of research as those dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance. These literatures explore the causes of attitudes (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2008).

In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with information such as our two dependent variables measuring participation in environmental organizations. We calculate the marginal effects to measure the quantitative effect of a variable, because the equation is nonlinear. Marginal effects indicate the change in the probability of individuals having a specific level of environmental preferences when the independent variable increases by one unit. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the samples correspond to the national distribution.⁴ Furthermore, answers such as ‘don’t know’ and missing values are eliminated in all estimations.

Table 1 presents the findings regarding being a member in an environmental organization. In the first three specifications we explore our key environmental motivation variables m separately and the fourth includes all the three variables in the specification. The results from the first three specifications indicate that all the m proxies are statistically significant. The first two have a positive impact, and the third has a negative impact. Thus, *hypothesis 1* cannot be rejected. A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher moral standards induces voluntary involvement in environmental organizations. The negative coefficient in specification (3) is consistent with our prediction as it measures individuals’ interest in free-riding. A higher willingness to free-ride is negatively correlated with environmental engagement. The variable WILLINGESS TO GIVE INCOME has the strongest effect. An increase in the scale by one unit raises the probability of participating in an environmental organization by 2.5 percentage points. The importance of this variable is also visible once you include all three variables in the regression. The coefficient is still statistically significant at the 1% level with a marginal effect of 1.9 percentage points. On the other hand, the

⁴ The weighting variable is provided by the EVS.

coefficient for the variable WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES is only statistically significant at the 10% level, and also shows a decrease in the marginal effects. Overall, these first results indicate that environmental motivation matters.

Looking at the control variables we can see that women are more likely to be members of environmental organizations. Age is also positively correlated with being a member. Overall, the age group AGE 50-59 shows the strongest level of environmental participation (largest marginal effects). Having a child is negatively correlated with environmental participation, as time restrictions may act as a barrier to being involved in environmental organizations. Education and political interest, measured as political discussion, have a positive impact on the probability of being a member in an environmental organization. The time restriction argument may also be invoked when focusing on the marital status. Those who have never before been married, as well as those who are separated have the highest probability of participating in environmental organizations. Moreover, when taking into account the employment status, we observe part time employees are more likely to be members. There is also the tendency for self-employed individuals to be more active in environmental organizations, probably because of the chance to improve their networks. On the other hand, the time restriction argument fails when it comes to the unemployed and retired, as they are less likely to be members than full-time employees. Finally, we also observe that people in Western Europe are more engaged in environmental organizations through membership participation. The marginal effects are quite large (more than 4 percentage points).

In *Table 2* we explore a second aspect, namely doing unpaid work for environmental organizations. The results are quite similar. All the proxies for m in

specification (5) to (7) are statistically significant. The strongest effects are again observable for the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME. However, it should be noted that compared to *Table 1* we find lower quantitative effects. Specification (8) also shows that the coefficient for the variable CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS is not anymore statistically significant.

Looking at the control variables we find that compared to previously there is a negative correlation between environmental participation and being a woman. Thus, women are more likely to be a member in an environmental organization, but are less likely to do unpaid work. However, it can be argued that women might be more active in community-based and neighborhood organizations which address local environmental issues, while men are more likely to participate in formal environmental organizations. Our survey question captures more of the latter than the former – for this reason, our results may not be in great conflict with findings to the contrary. Moreover, it should be noted that women (particularly younger women) have higher restrictions on participation in voluntary organizations, as they are often more heavily involved in time intensive household activities.

The age effect is now less visible, but we still observe that the AGE group 50-59 has the strongest probability of doing unpaid work. Also, the parental effect is now less obvious. On the other hand education and political interest have a significant and positive impact on environmental engagement. Moreover, we also observe that the “never married” individuals are the most active in environmental organizations. On the other hand, only retired people are significantly less willing than the full time-employed individuals to be active in environmental organizations through unpaid work. Finally we

also observe that Western European citizens are more likely to be environmentally engaged. However, the effect is less strong than previously and the coefficient is no longer statistically significant in all specifications.

In the next two tables we extend the previous regression by including individuals' economic situation with two dummy variables. It should be noted that the number of observations in *Table 3* and *4* strongly decreased after controlling for individuals' economic situation. The results indicate that a higher level of economic status leads to a higher probability of being a member and doing unpaid work in environmental organizations. It seems that wealthier citizens have a higher demand for a clean environment and less environmental damages and thus a stronger incentive to actively contribute to the environment by participating in a voluntary organization. Thus, such a result is not consistent with our Eq. (9). However, it should be noted that the economic situation variable may not only cover the current wage but also the accumulated wealth over time. Nevertheless, we observe that the results obtained previously remain robust.

Table 5 explores the potential endogeneity problems. One can argue that being involved in an environmental organization enhances pro-social environmental attitudes. To control for such a problem, we will use an instrumental approach to check the robustness of the results. A suitable instrument must be contemporaneously uncorrelated with the error term but must be highly correlated with membership in a voluntary environmental organization. We use an index of perceived level of social non-compliance

with well-known social rules⁵. For simplicity, we only report the results on membership involvement in *Table 5*. The table reports the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations together with the first stage regressions. The results indicate that attitudinal questions have a strong and significant impact on environmental involvement. In addition, *Table 5* also shows that the instruments and the *F*-tests for the instrument exclusion set in the first-stage regression are statistically significant. There is a negative correlation between our environmental motivation variables and the perceived level of dishonest behavior. We also report the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of the instruments, checking the relevance of the excluded instruments. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant (see Hall et al., 1996). Moreover, we show results of the Anderson-Rubin test indicating that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. *Table 5* reports that in all cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis, which indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant and has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments.

Finally, we test in *Table 6* and *7* whether the impact of environmental motivation on environmental involvement is driven by a subset of countries and present the results for the coefficients for environmental attitudes in both tables using the specifications in the first two tables (without controlling for the economic situation). Each table is a

⁵Aggregated index of the following questions: According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following: Claiming state benefits to which they are not entitled. Driving under the influence of alcohol. Speeding over the limit in built-up areas (each scale from 4=almost all to 1=almost none).

summary of 96 regressions conducted within 32 countries. *Table 6* focuses on membership participation, while *Table 7* explores unpaid work as a dependent variable. In general we observe differences between the countries. *Table 6* shows that the coefficient of the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is statistically significant in 25 out of 32 cases, and the strongest effect is observed for the Netherlands. An increase in the WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME by one unit increases the probability of being a member in an environmental organization by almost 10 percentage points. A strong quantitative effect is also observed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece, however the effects are generally lower among Eastern European countries. We find a similar result for the variable WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES. The coefficient is statistically significant in 24 out 32 cases. The strongest effect can also be found in the Netherlands (9.1 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.4 percentage points) and Greece (3.4 percentage points). The results are less strong when focusing on willingness to free-ride. However, here we also observe the strongest negative impact for the Netherlands (8.9 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.2 percentage points) and Belgium (4.2 percentage points). Looking at *Table 7* and therefore at unpaid work we find that the relationship is less strong when using unpaid work instead of membership participation as a dependent variable. Thus, environmental motivation helps to substantially increase the number of memberships, but is less strong when individuals are required to do unpaid work for environmental organizations. The coefficient for the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is now only statistically significant in 18 out 32 regressions. The quantitative effects are also substantially smaller. Greece reports the

strongest effect with a marginal effect of 3.5 percentage points. Moreover, it should be noted that the same picture can be found for the other two motivational questions.

Table 1: Determinants of Being A Member in Environmental Organizations

	WEIGHTED PROBIT											
	(1)			(2)			(3)			(4)		
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>
<i>Environmental Motivation (m)</i>												
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME	0.313***	19.07	0.025							0.250***	11.97	0.019
WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES				0.223***	14.81	0.019				0.032*	1.70	0.002
CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS							-0.246***	-17.43	-0.020	-0.177***	-11.79	-0.014
<i>Gender</i>												
FEMALE	0.054**	1.97	0.004	0.067**	2.47	0.006	0.059**	2.15	0.005	0.056**	1.99	0.004
<i>Age</i>												
AGE 30-39	0.056	1.22	0.004	0.048	1.07	0.004	0.065	1.44	0.005	0.056	1.19	0.004
AGE 40-49	0.115**	2.38	0.010	0.087*	1.82	0.008	0.110**	2.28	0.010	0.112**	2.25	0.009
AGE 50-59	0.237***	4.65	0.022	0.216***	4.31	0.021	0.251***	4.93	0.024	0.243***	4.62	0.022
AGE 60-69	0.189***	2.97	0.017	0.175***	2.77	0.016	0.212***	3.32	0.020	0.198***	3.02	0.018
AGE 70+	0.238***	3.23	0.022	0.198***	2.68	0.019	0.213***	2.89	0.020	0.227***	2.96	0.021
<i>Parental Effect</i>												
CHILD	-0.104*	-1.90	-0.008	-0.120**	-2.19	-0.009	-0.117**	-2.15	-0.009	-0.108*	-1.91	-0.008
<i>Formal and Informal Educ.</i>												
EDUCATION	0.025***	12.02	0.002	0.025***	12.40	0.002	0.025***	12.18	0.002	0.022***	10.24	0.002
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	0.142***	7.01	0.011	0.151***	7.53	0.013	0.134***	6.64	0.011	0.114***	5.45	0.009
<i>Marital Status</i>												
WIDOWED	-0.103*	-1.69	-0.007	-0.159***	-2.60	-0.012	-0.143**	-2.37	-0.011	-0.133**	-2.08	-0.009
DIVORCED	-0.062	-1.25	-0.005	-0.065	-1.31	-0.005	-0.072	-1.44	-0.006	-0.062	-1.20	-0.005
SEPARATED	0.010	0.10	0.001	0.001	0.01	0.000	0.030	0.31	0.002	0.040	0.39	0.003
NEVER MARRIED	0.123***	3.24	0.010	0.121***	3.24	0.011	0.135***	3.58	0.012	0.128***	3.29	0.011
<i>Employment Status</i>												
PART TIME EMPLOYEE	0.141***	3.09	0.012	0.159***	3.54	0.015	0.158***	3.45	0.015	0.151***	3.22	0.013
SELFEMPLOYED	0.085	1.63	0.007	0.087*	1.67	0.008	0.086	1.63	0.008	0.096*	1.81	0.008
UNEMPLOYED	-0.099**	-1.97	-0.007	-0.091**	-1.82	-0.007	-0.076	-1.51	-0.006	-0.068	-1.32	-0.005

AT HOME	-0.114**	-2.19	-0.008	-0.105**	-2.06	-0.008	-0.087*	-1.69	-0.007	-0.094*	-1.76	-0.007
STUDENT	-0.041	-0.66	-0.003	-0.007	-0.12	-0.001	-0.037	-0.60	-0.003	-0.061	-0.96	-0.005
RETIRED	-0.252***	-3.96	-0.016	-0.227***	-3.61	-0.016	-0.206***	-3.30	-0.014	-0.219***	-3.37	-0.014
OTHER	0.138	1.48	0.012	0.170*	1.85	0.016	0.166*	1.80	0.016	0.151	1.59	0.013
<i>Region</i>												
WESTERN EUROPE	0.595***	20.91	0.047	0.554***	19.90	0.046	0.454	16.38	0.037	0.522***	17.99	0.040
Pseudo R2	0.101			0.086			0.093			0.114		
Number of observations	36086			36052			36237			34428		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 2: Determinants of Unpaid Work in Environmental Organizations

	WEIGHTED PROBIT											
	(5)			(6)			(7)			(8)		
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>
<i>Environmental Motivation (m)</i>												
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME	0.233***	10.45	0.009							0.204***	7.47	0.008
WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES				0.162***	7.89	0.007				0.045*	1.83	0.002
CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS							-0.091***	-4.83	-0.004	-0.028	-1.39	-0.001
<i>Gender</i>												
FEMALE	-0.100***	-2.79	-0.004	-0.085**	-2.40	-0.004	-0.092**	-2.61	-0.004	-0.094**	-2.55	-0.004
<i>Age</i>												
AGE 30-39	0.017	0.30	0.001	0.018	0.31	0.001	0.029	0.52	0.001	0.019	0.33	0.001
AGE 40-49	0.094	1.58	0.004	0.077	1.32	0.003	0.090	1.54	0.004	0.081	1.34	0.003
AGE 50-59	0.126*	1.96	0.005	0.127**	2.02	0.006	0.141**	2.22	0.006	0.116*	1.77	0.005
AGE 60-69	0.123	1.51	0.005	0.096	1.18	0.004	0.116	1.42	0.005	0.110	1.30	0.005
AGE 70+	0.101	0.92	0.004	0.055	0.50	0.002	0.035	0.31	0.001	0.049	0.42	0.002
<i>Parental Effect</i>												
CHILD	-0.106	-1.22	-0.004	-0.115	-1.35	-0.004	-0.101	-1.19	-0.004	-0.082	-0.94	-0.003
<i>Formal and Informal Educ.</i>												
EDUCATION	0.019***	7.13	0.001	0.020***	7.40	0.001	0.021***	7.90	0.001	0.019***	6.71	0.001
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	0.110***	3.98	0.004	0.119***	4.37	0.005	0.115***	4.28	0.005	0.099***	3.53	0.004
<i>Marital Status</i>												
WIDOWED	-0.023	-0.28	-0.001	-0.062	-0.74	-0.002	-0.060	-0.72	-0.002	-0.049	-0.56	-0.002
DIVORCED	-0.100	-1.50	-0.004	-0.091	-1.40	-0.003	-0.102	-1.56	-0.004	-0.103	-1.53	-0.004
SEPARATED	0.160	1.22	0.007	0.148	1.15	0.007	0.161	1.25	0.008	0.181	1.36	0.009
NEVER MARRIED	0.139***	2.92	0.006	0.138***	2.95	0.006	0.144***	3.07	0.007	0.144***	2.96	0.006

Employment Status												
PART TIME EMPLOYEE	0.064	0.99	0.003	0.071	1.13	0.003	0.080	1.28	0.004	0.065	0.99	0.003
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.036	-0.50	-0.001	-0.028	-0.39	-0.001	-0.041	-0.57	-0.002	-0.034	-0.46	-0.001
UNEMPLOYED	-0.114	-1.60	-0.004	-0.095	-1.35	-0.004	-0.103	-1.46	-0.004	-0.096	-1.31	-0.004
AT HOME	-0.163**	-2.13	-0.006	-0.137*	-1.85	-0.005	-0.140*	-1.88	-0.005	-0.161**	-2.07	-0.005
STUDENT	0.073	1.02	0.003	0.119*	1.69	0.005	0.100	1.43	0.005	0.068	0.94	0.003
RETIRED	-0.310***	-3.79	-0.009	-0.310***	-3.82	-0.010	-0.317***	-3.90	-0.010	-0.299***	-3.59	-0.009
OTHER	0.139	1.14	0.006	0.146	1.21	0.007	0.140	1.16	0.007	0.157	1.27	0.007
Region												
WESTERN EUROPE	0.092***	2.69	0.004	0.069**	2.04	0.003	0.024	0.69	0.001	0.069*	1.93	0.003
Pseudo R2	0.053			0.043			0.037			0.055		
Number of observations	36086			36052			36237			34428		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 3: Income and Membership in Environmental Organizations

	WEIGHTED PROBIT											
	(9)			(10)			(11)			(12)		
	Coeff.	z-Stat.	Marg.	Coeff.	z-Stat.	Marg.	Coeff.	z-Stat.	Marg.	Coeff.	z-Stat.	Marg.
<i>Environmental Motivation (m)</i>												
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME	0.295***	12.87	0.023							0.264***	9.15	0.020
WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES				0.196***	9.44	0.016				0.008	0.31	0.001
CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS							-0.205***	-10.37	-0.017	-0.141***	-6.77	-0.011
<i>Gender</i>												
FEMALE	0.083**	2.02	0.006	0.090**	2.22	0.007	0.084**	2.07	0.007	0.085**	2.03	0.007
<i>Age</i>												
AGE 30-39	-0.058	-0.88	-0.004	-0.055	-0.85	-0.004	-0.043	-0.66	-0.003	-0.059	-0.88	-0.004
AGE 40-49	0.011	0.16	0.001	-0.014	-0.20	-0.001	0.002	0.03	0.000	0.013	0.19	0.001
AGE 50-59	0.141*	1.93	0.012	0.120*	1.65	0.011	0.154**	2.09	0.014	0.148*	1.95	0.012
AGE 60-69	0.000	0.00	0.000	0.002	0.02	0.000	0.033	0.37	0.003	0.012	0.13	0.001
AGE 70+	-0.051	-0.45	-0.004	-0.102	-0.89	-0.008	-0.108	-0.93	-0.008	-0.099	-0.82	-0.007
<i>Parental Effect</i>												
CHILD	-0.044	-0.54	-0.003	-0.044	-0.54	-0.004	-0.039	-0.47	-0.003	-0.030	-0.35	-0.002
<i>Formal and Informal Educ.</i>												
EDUCATION	0.026***	7.54	0.002	0.026***	7.78	0.002	0.027***	7.95	0.002	0.024***	6.79	0.002
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	0.147***	4.99	0.012	0.155***	5.29	0.013	0.138***	4.70	0.011	0.123***	4.06	0.009
<i>Economic Situation</i>												
UPPER CLASS	0.142***	2.65	0.012	0.163***	3.06	0.015	0.156***	2.89	0.014	0.125**	2.26	0.010
MIDDLE CLASS	0.087**	2.04	0.007	0.092**	2.19	0.008	0.083*	1.95	0.007	0.079*	1.79	0.006
<i>Marital Status</i>												
WIDOWED	-0.067	-0.75	-0.005	-0.122	-1.35	-0.009	-0.095	-1.06	-0.007	-0.104	-1.09	-0.007
DIVORCED	-0.079	-1.06	-0.006	-0.094	-1.27	-0.007	-0.108	-1.43	-0.008	-0.088	-1.14	-0.006

SEPARATED	0.015	0.10	0.001	0.016	0.11	0.001	0.050	0.36	0.004	0.048	0.33	0.004
NEVER MARRIED	0.001	0.01	0.000	0.002	0.04	0.000	0.017	0.29	0.001	0.013	0.23	0.001
<i>Employment Status</i>												
PART TIME	0.088	1.21	0.007	0.108	1.53	0.010	0.093	1.29	0.008	0.091	1.22	0.007
EMPLOYEE												
SELFEMPLOYED	0.059	0.75	0.005	0.055	0.72	0.005	0.063	0.81	0.005	0.074	0.95	0.006
UNEMPLOYED	-0.029	-0.42	-0.002	-0.027	-0.38	-0.002	-0.017	-0.24	-0.001	-0.013	-0.18	-0.001
AT HOME	-0.176**	-2.40	-0.012	-0.158**	-2.20	-0.012	-0.146**	-2.01	-0.011	-0.172**	-2.27	-0.012
STUDENT	-0.108	-1.22	-0.008	-0.056	-0.65	-0.004	-0.105	-1.21	-0.008	-0.128	-1.42	-0.009
RETIRED	-0.041	-0.50	-0.003	-0.028	-0.34	-0.002	-0.022	-0.27	-0.002	-0.036	-0.43	-0.003
OTHER	0.092	0.64	0.008	0.093	0.65	0.008	0.101	0.71	0.009	0.116	0.79	0.010
<i>Region</i>												
WESTERN EUROPE	0.355***	8.06	0.026	0.301***	7.02	0.023	0.254***	5.93	0.019	0.334***	7.39	0.023
Pseudo R2	0.070			0.066			0.070			0.094		
Number of observations	18862			18887			18877			18155		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 4: Income and Unpaid Work in Environmental Organizations

	WEIGHTED PROBIT											
	(13)			(14)			(15)			(16)		
	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>	<i>Coeff.</i>	<i>z-Stat.</i>	<i>Marg.</i>
<i>Environmental Motivation (m)</i>												
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME	0.231***	8.06	0.010							0.212***	5.98	0.009
WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES				0.153***	5.77	0.007				0.008	0.26	0.0003
CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS							-0.138***	-5.44	-0.006	-0.084***	-3.18	-0.003
<i>Gender</i>												
FEMALE	-0.158***	-3.04	-0.007	-0.144***	-2.80	-0.006	-0.145***	-2.80	-0.006	-0.155***	-2.90	-0.006
<i>Age</i>												
AGE 30-39	0.011	0.14	0.000	0.009	0.11	0.000	0.027	0.34	0.001	0.015	0.18	0.001
AGE 40-49	0.006	0.06	0.000	-0.007	-0.08	0.000	0.005	0.06	0.000	0.001	0.01	0.000
AGE 50-59	0.099	1.09	0.004	0.088	0.99	0.004	0.111	1.23	0.005	0.089	0.95	0.004
AGE 60-69	0.040	0.36	0.002	0.016	0.15	0.001	0.038	0.34	0.002	0.030	0.26	0.001
AGE 70+	0.052	0.35	0.002	0.012	0.08	0.001	-0.030	-0.19	-0.001	-0.013	-0.08	-0.001
<i>Parental Effect</i>												
CHILD	-0.042	-0.35	-0.002	-0.039	-0.33	-0.002	-0.016	-0.14	-0.001	-0.005	-0.04	0.000
<i>Formal and Informal Educ.</i>												
EDUCATION	0.022***	5.43	0.001	0.023***	5.62	0.001	0.023***	5.68	0.001	0.021***	4.85	0.001
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	0.064*	1.68	0.003	0.066*	1.78	0.003	0.055	1.48	0.002	0.039	1.01	0.002
<i>Economic Situation</i>												
UPPER CLASS	0.237***	3.58	0.012	0.254***	3.91	0.014	0.255***	3.83	0.013	0.241***	3.54	0.012
MIDDLE CLASS	0.153***	2.79	0.007	0.156***	2.88	0.007	0.161***	2.93	0.007	0.166***	2.95	0.007
<i>Marital Status</i>												
WIDOWED	0.029	0.25	0.001	-0.006	-0.05	0.000	0.011	0.09	0.000	-0.007	-0.06	0.000

DIVORCED	-0.077	-0.85	-0.003	-0.085	-0.94	-0.003	-0.106	-1.16	-0.004	-0.095	-1.03	-0.004
SEPARATED	0.082	0.45	0.004	0.075	0.42	0.004	0.102	0.56	0.005	0.104	0.55	0.005
NEVER MARRIED	0.052	0.76	0.002	0.056	0.83	0.003	0.071	1.02	0.003	0.069	0.99	0.003
Employment Status												
PART TIME EMPLOYEE	0.038	0.40	0.002	0.062	0.69	0.003	0.055	0.59	0.002	0.048	0.50	0.002
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.015	-0.16	-0.001	-0.010	-0.11	0.000	-0.024	-0.25	-0.001	-0.018	-0.19	-0.001
UNEMPLOYED	-0.071	-0.77	-0.003	-0.063	-0.69	-0.003	-0.054	-0.58	-0.002	-0.058	-0.61	-0.002
AT HOME	-0.160	-1.62	-0.006	-0.141	-1.48	-0.006	-0.144	-1.49	-0.006	-0.158	-1.57	-0.006
STUDENT	0.002	0.02	0.000	0.024	0.23	0.001	0.007	0.07	0.000	0.000	0.00	0.000
RETIRED	-0.209*	-1.90	-0.007	-0.203*	-1.87	-0.007	-0.204*	-1.86	-0.007	-0.199*	-1.76	-0.007
OTHER	0.224	1.42	0.012	0.222	1.42	0.012	0.229	1.46	0.012	0.252	1.56	0.013
Region												
WESTERN EUROPE	0.119**	2.32	0.005	0.087*	1.71	0.004	0.057	1.12	0.002	0.110**	2.07	0.004
Pseudo R2	0.063			0.053			0.053			0.070		
Number of observations	18862			18887			18877			18155		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 5: 2SLS Focusing on Environmental Membership

WEIGHTED 2SLS	2SLS (17)		FIRST STAGE REGRESSION		2SLS (18)		FIRST STAGE REGRESSION		2SLS (19)		FIRST STAGE REGRESSION	
	Coeff.	t-Stat.	Coeff.	t-Stat.	Coeff.	t-Stat.	Coeff.	t-Stat.	Coeff.	t-Stat.	t-Stat.	Coeff.
<i>Environmental Motivation (m)</i>												
WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME	0.353***	3.61										
WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES					0.232***	4.65						
CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS									-0.267***	-4.29		
<i>Gender</i>												
FEMALE	-0.019**	-2.09	0.075***	6.20	-0.005	-1.07	0.059***	4.92	0.001	0.16	-0.025**	-2.07
<i>Age</i>												
AGE 30-39	0.014*	1.78	-0.028	-1.51	0.010	1.53	-0.023	-1.23	0.016**	2.28	0.043**	2.17
AGE 40-49	0.032***	3.28	-0.060***	-2.98	0.013**	1.97	-0.011	-0.55	0.017**	2.33	0.019	0.89
AGE 50-59	0.048***	4.48	-0.065***	-2.95	0.031***	4.20	-0.029	-1.34	0.041***	4.89	0.055**	2.42
AGE 60-69	0.044***	3.49	-0.060**	-2.17	0.030***	3.26	-0.035	-1.28	0.054***	4.58	0.119***	4.34
AGE 70+	0.073***	3.86	-0.148***	-4.51	0.034***	3.12	-0.059*	-1.83	0.049***	3.85	0.109***	3.34
<i>Parental Effect</i>												
CHILD	-0.008	-0.89	-0.002	-0.11	-0.014*	-1.92	0.018	0.86	-0.023***	-2.90	-0.050**	-2.34
<i>Formal and Informal Educ.</i>												
EDUCATION	-0.002	-1.40	0.017***	15.84	0.000	-0.39	0.017***	15.26	-0.001	-0.99	-0.018***	-15.62
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	-0.033**	-2.27	0.143***	15.91	-0.013*	-1.76	0.131***	14.66	-0.022**	-2.24	-0.148***	-16.42
<i>Marital Status</i>												
WIDOWED	0.024*	1.77	-0.093***	-3.92	0.004	0.47	-0.065***	-2.79	0.001	0.17	0.043*	1.89
DIVORCED	0.024**	2.03	-0.079***	-3.50	0.013	1.61	-0.073***	-3.27	0.013	1.49	0.064***	2.92
SEPARATED	-0.004	-0.19	0.020	0.48	0.007	0.45	-0.014	-0.32	0.022	1.33	0.069	1.62
NEVER MARRIED	0.025***	3.25	-0.029*	-1.65	0.022***	3.61	-0.032*	-1.89	0.021***	3.27	0.021	1.16

Employment Status												
PART TIME EMPLOYEE	0.009	0.89	0.030	1.34	0.016*	1.96	0.019	0.87	0.014	1.62	-0.024	-1.03
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.013	-1.13	0.071***	3.10	0.001	0.09	0.045*	1.93	-0.006	-0.59	-0.062**	-2.52
UNEMPLOYED	0.013	1.11	-0.074***	-3.24	0.002	0.27	-0.065***	-2.89	0.016	1.59	0.105***	4.67
AT HOME	-0.009	-1.00	-0.001	-0.04	-0.001	-0.20	-0.038*	-1.75	0.016*	1.69	0.096***	4.32
STUDENT	-0.040***	-2.85	0.082***	2.97	-0.015	-1.55	0.032	1.15	-0.034***	-2.92	-0.092***	-3.16
RETIRED	0.021	1.48	-0.114***	-4.86	0.005	0.66	-0.105***	-4.71	0.025**	2.05	0.163***	7.54
OTHER	0.022	1.21	-0.004	-0.08	0.016	1.00	0.037	0.86	0.012	0.73	-0.049	-1.11
Region												
WESTERN EUROPE	0.111***	6.25	-0.177***	-15.69	0.073***	11.40	-0.106***	-9.42	-0.024	-1.37	-0.271***	-23.66
Instrument:												
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF DISHONESTY			-0.009***	-4.06			-0.014***	-6.20			0.012***	5.30
Test of excluded instruments			16.45***				38.50				28.10***	
Anderson canon. cor. LR statistic	21.552***				47.697***				32.857***			
Anderson-Rubin test	43.86***				41.73***				40.040***			

Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 6: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Membership Participation in Single Countries

<i>96 REGRESSIONS</i>	<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>			<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>			<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>		
<i>VARIABLE:</i>	WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME (32 REGRESSIONS)			WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES (32 REGRESSIONS)			CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS (32 REGRESSIONS)		
COUNTRIES									
Western European Countries									
Germany	0.586***	4.47	0.012	0.365***	3.24	0.011	-0.244**	-2.47	-0.008
Austria	0.299***	4.51	0.041	0.193***	3.29	0.028	-0.175***	-3.03	-0.025
Belgium	0.263***	5.36	0.046	0.159***	3.33	0.029	-0.241***	-5.05	-0.042
Great Britain	1.119***	3.51	0.001	0.887***	4.51	0.003	-0.030	-0.14	-0.001
Denmark	0.207***	3.12	0.041	0.224***	3.63	0.044	-0.234***	-3.56	-0.046
Finland	0.402***	3.60	0.027	0.259**	2.44	0.021	-0.187*	-1.90	-0.016
France	0.269***	3.02	0.008	0.141*	1.74	0.005	-0.017	-0.20	-0.001
Iceland	0.161	1.29	0.013	0.291**	2.25	0.022	-0.077	-0.65	-0.006
Ireland	0.316*	1.88	0.007	0.102	0.79	0.002	-0.116	-1.02	-0.003
Italy	0.422***	4.15	0.022	0.273***	3.64	0.017	-0.267***	-3.89	-0.016
Luxembourg	0.211***	3.06	0.035	0.137**	2.11	0.023	-0.116*	-1.88	-0.019
Malta	0.060	0.56	0.003	-0.078	0.66	-0.004	-0.023	-0.20	-0.001
Netherlands	0.240***	4.03	0.095	0.232***	4.06	0.091	-0.227***	-3.34	-0.089
North Ireland	0.538***	2.65	0.021	0.692***	3.17	0.018	-0.075	-0.50	-0.004
Portugal	2.473***	4.22	0.000	0.095	0.39	0.000	0.148	0.72	0.000
Spain	0.481***	3.77	0.010	0.237**	2.14	0.006	-0.306**	-2.38	-0.007
Sweden	0.237***	2.73	0.040	0.074	0.98	0.013	-0.133*	-1.86	-0.022
Eastern European Countries									
Belarus	0.229	1.39	0.005	0.335***	2.38	0.007	-0.109	-0.84	-0.003

Bulgaria	0.633***	3.86	0.009	0.437***	2.83	0.008	-0.190	-1.34	-0.005
Croatia	0.146	1.10	0.004	-0.006	-0.03	0.000	-0.122	-0.91	-0.004
Czech Republic	0.234***	2.79	0.028	0.141**	2.07	0.017	-0.107*	-1.66	-0.013
Estonia	0.608***	3.89	0.015	0.312*	1.78	0.011	-0.216	-1.65	-0.008
Greece	0.309***	3.94	0.049	0.225***	3.35	0.037	-0.044	-0.70	-0.007
Hungary	0.435***	3.17	0.010	0.360***	2.98	0.011	-0.274***	-3.28	-0.010
Latvia	0.312*	1.74	0.001	0.427***	2.65	0.010	-0.502**	-1.97	-0.010
Lithuania	1.078***	4.08	0.002	0.520***	3.13	0.007	-0.254	-1.21	-0.003
Poland	0.312**	2.15	0.004	0.362**	2.06	0.004	-0.048	-0.39	-0.001
Romania	-0.116	-0.82	-0.003	0.032	0.21	0.001	0.216	1.37	0.010
Russia	0.422***	3.99	0.005	0.135	0.91	0.002	0.307**	2.34	0.004
Slovak Republic	0.365***	3.57	0.015	0.347***	3.95	0.016	-0.173**	-2.22	-0.009
Slovenia	0.152	0.90	0.010	0.021	0.16	0.001	0.111	1.21	0.007
Ukraine	0.120	0.62	0.001	0.386**	2.08	0.002	-0.167	-1.16	-0.001

Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

Table 7: The Impact of Environmental Motivation on Unpaid Work in Single Countries

<i>96 REGRESSIONS</i>	<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>			<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>			<i>WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT ESTIMATIONS</i>		
<i>VARIABLE:</i>	WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME (32 REGRESSIONS)			WILLINGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES (32 REGRESSIONS)			CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS (32 REGRESSIONS)		
COUNTRIES									
Western European Countries									
Germany	0.650***	3.40	0.004	0.607***	4.14	0.005	-0.330**	-2.13	-0.005
Austria	0.164*	1.71	0.007	0.044	0.52	0.002	-0.117	-1.56	-0.006
Belgium	0.107*	1.68	0.006	0.073	1.13	0.004	0.006	0.08	0.000
Great Britain	0.229**	2.11	0.024	0.110	1.04	0.012	-0.171*	-1.68	-0.017
Denmark	0.193	1.61	0.007	0.058	0.60	0.002	-0.181	-1.52	-0.007
Finland	0.198	1.07	0.007	0.254	1.40	0.007	-0.156	-1.27	-0.005
France	0.226**	2.03	0.003	0.150	1.30	0.002	-0.085	-0.79	-0.001
Iceland	0.339	1.35	0.009	0.328	1.56	0.009	0.019	0.12	0.001
Ireland	-0.132	-0.65	0.000	-0.038	-0.21	0.000	0.154	0.77	0.000
Italy	0.410***	3.16	0.013	0.270***	2.90	0.009	-0.352***	-3.94	-0.012
Luxembourg	0.211**	2.10	0.016	0.099	1.01	0.008	-0.106	-1.18	-0.008
Malta	0.193	1.22	0.011	-0.053	-0.37	-0.003	-0.014	-0.11	-0.001
Netherlands	0.117	0.90	0.007	0.240*	1.84	0.013	0.154	1.06	0.009
North Ireland	1.513**	2.34	0.000	0.576***	3.15	0.001	-0.263	-0.80	0.000
Portugal	9.210	1.28	0.000	-0.382	-1.30	0.000	0.032	0.12	0.000
Spain	1.141***	3.76	0.001	0.391***	3.01	0.004	-0.406**	-2.40	-0.004
Sweden	0.346**	2.13	0.013	0.178	1.37	0.007	-0.151	-1.60	-0.006

Eastern European Countries										
Belarus	0.118	1.27	0.003	0.060	0.63	0.001	0.178**	2.04	0.005	
Bulgaria	0.479***	3.50	0.007	0.277**	2.01	0.005	-0.174	-1.25	-0.003	
Croatia	0.167	1.15	0.003	-0.063	-0.31	-0.001	-0.039	-0.26	-0.001	
Czech Republic	0.130	1.39	0.008	0.156*	1.72	0.009	-0.162*	-1.77	-0.009	
Estonia	0.746***	3.99	0.000	0.249	1.10	0.000	-0.288	-1.60	0.000	
Greece	0.226***	2.72	0.035	0.111	1.64	0.018	0.049	0.74	0.008	
Hungary	0.362***	3.42	0.011	0.211*	1.86	0.008	-0.137	-1.46	-0.005	
Latvia	0.009	0.06	0.000	0.008	0.07	0.000	0.226	0.23	0.001	
Lithuania	0.886***	3.87	0.003	0.741***	3.55	0.006	0.009	0.03	0.000	
Poland	1.010***	3.48	0.000	0.028	0.13	0.000	-0.367**	-2.40	0.000	
Romania	-0.127	-0.73	-0.001	0.076	0.50	0.001	0.318	1.12	0.003	
Russia	0.337***	2.80	0.003	0.309*	1.85	0.004	0.189	1.19	0.003	
Slovak Republic	0.358***	2.63	0.013	0.341***	3.08	0.013	-0.197**	-2.29	-0.009	
Slovenia	0.126	0.71	0.008	0.016	0.12	0.001	0.007	0.07	0.070	
Ukraine	0.175	0.62	0.000	0.586***	2.84	0.000	-1.183***	-4.74	0.000	

Notes: Only the attitudinal coefficient is reported in the Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This paper investigates whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior. We therefore present first of a model that explores the relationship between environmental motivation and volunteering. In next step we test the hypothesis generated in the theoretical empirically. Behavioral engagement has been proxied through the participation in environmental organizations focusing on two aspects, namely being a member and doing unpaid work for environmental organizations. We also use three different proxies for environmental motivation, two of which measure pro-environmental attitudes, namely the willingness to give part of the own income to prevent environmental pollution, and to agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is use to prevent environmental pollution. In addition, we have explored a variable that measures people's incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). The motivation behind such a study is the observation that deterrence models fail to predict the relatively high level of compliance in various situations, ranging from tax compliance, over contributing to provide a public good, to not littering despite the low probability of getting caught and penalized. This paper provides support for the idea that environmental motivation indeed affects individuals' voluntary involvement in environmental organizations by using a large micro-data set covering not less than 32 different countries providing also a summary for every single country (almost 200 regressions). In addition, we have explored potential endogeneity problems. The results show robust findings and therefore indicate that attitudinal questions help to explain behavioral consequences. Environmental motivation, environmental morale or pro-environmental attitudes are

highly relevant in understanding why people have a higher willingness to be involved in environmental protection. However, it should be noted that these social norms work stronger towards being a member rather than doing unpaid work in environmental organizations. Unpaid work is associated with higher opportunity costs which may help to explain such a difference. Finally, it should be noted that further investigations are required to gain a better understanding of what shapes individuals' environmental motivation. This would provide a better foundation to derive policy implications to promote, encourage and maintain a higher willingness to contribute to the environment.

Table A1

Description of control variables

Variable	Derivation
Age	AGE 30-39, AGE40-49, AGE 50-59, AGE 60-69, AGE +70 (AGE -30 in the reference group.)
Gender	WOMAN (MAN in the reference group)
Parent Effect	CHILD (not having children in the reference group)
Formal and Informal Education	<p>EDUCATION: What is the highest educational level that you have attained?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. No formal education 2. Incomplete primary school 3. Completed primary school 4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 8. Some university-level education, without degree 9. University-level education, with degree <hr/> <p>POLITICAL DISCUSSION: When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Never 2. Occasionally 3. Frequently
Marital Status	WIDOWED; DIVORCED; SEPARATED; NEVER MARRIED (MARRIED in the reference group)
Economic Situation	<p>People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the:</p> <p>UPPER CLASS, MIDDLE CLASS (the rest, WORKING CLASS and LOWER CLASS, in the reference group).</p>
Employment Status	PART-TIME EMPLOYEE, SELFEMPLOYED, UNEMPLOYED, AT HOME, STUDENT, RETIRED, OTHER (FULL TIME EMPLOYED in the reference group).

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Key variables					
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES (INCOME)	38877	1.620	0.885	0	3
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTIDUES (TAXES)	38834	1.412	0.877	0	3
ENVIRONMENTAL FREE-RIDING MEMBER VOLUNTARY	39038	1.996	0.894	0	3
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION WORKING VOLUNTARY	41125	0.049	0.216	0	1
ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATION	41125	0.020	0.140	0	1
Control Variables					
AGE 30-39	40963	0.197	0.398	0	1
AGE 40-49	40963	0.191	0.393	0	1
AGE 50-59	40963	0.15	0.357	0	1
AGE 60-69	40963	0.135	0.342	0	1
AGE 70+	40963	0.102	0.302	0	1
WOMAN	41114	0.54	0.498	0	1
CHILDREN	41125	0.077	0.266	0	1
EDUCATION	39840	18.712	5.125	5	74
POLITICAL DISCUSSION	40713	1.886	0.654	1	3
UPPER CLASS	21335	0.136	0.343	0	1
MIDDLE CLASS	21335	0.338	0.473	0	1
WIDOWED	39861	0.097	0.295	0	1
DIVORCED	39861	0.07	0.256	0	1
SEPARATED	39861	0.016	0.124	0	1
NEVER MARRIED	39861	0.228	0.42	0	1
PART TIME EMPLOYED	40919	0.068	0.252	0	1
SELFEMPLOYED	40919	0.052	0.222	0	1
UNEMPLOYED	40919	0.229	0.42	0	1
AT HOME	40919	0.095	0.293	0	1
STUDENT	40919	0.061	0.24	0	1
RETIRED	40919	0.073	0.261	0	1
OTHER	40919	0.018	0.131	0	1
Instrument					
PERCEIVED LEVEL OF DISHONESTY	32903	13.098	2.496	5	20

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