A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent's bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, based on distributional implications of these two properties, which selects a single allocation which is Pareto-optimal and satisfies no-envy in two-agent exchange economies. There is no straightforward generalization of our procedure to more than two-agents.

Submitted: August 13, 2008 · Accepted: January 20, 2009 · Published: March 16, 2009

Recommended Citation

Dominguez, Diego A. and Nicolo, Antonio (2009) "Envy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 6.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1510
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol9/iss1/art6