A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Submitted: July 16, 2008 · Accepted: January 5, 2009 · Published: January 22, 2009

Recommended Citation

Loginova, Oksana; Lu, Haibin; and Wang, X. Henry (2009) "Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 2.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1501
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol9/iss1/art2