A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

The relationship between competition and performance–related pay has been analyzed in single–principal–single–agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. This paper describes a principal multi-agent model of incentive pay that analyzes the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used.

Submitted: April 3, 2008 · Accepted: March 31, 2009 · Published: June 5, 2009

Recommended Citation

Theilen, Bernd (2009) "Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 19.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1471
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol9/iss1/art19