A BEJTE Contributions article.

Abstract

We consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (``clubs") compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or choosing one club to admire. Clubs compete by providing a public good. Competition between clubs increases the public good provision level, and a sufficiently strong competition effect may even lead to overprovision. The model thus limits the argument for subsidies to the private providers of public goods. We discuss implications of the model for open-source software projects, university fundraising and infrastructure competition between cities.

Submitted: March 20, 2008 · Accepted: September 8, 2008 · Published: September 18, 2008

Recommended Citation

Polborn, Mattias K. (2008) "Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 (Contributions), Article 22.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol8/iss1/art22