Advances
Contributions
Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
Jose Penalva and Michael D. Ryall
Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
Miguel Aramendia, Luis Ruiz, and Quan Wen
A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
Roland Fryer and Matthew O. Jackson
Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
Jeong-Yoo Kim and Tackseung Jun
Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
Mattias K. Polborn
Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
Jaksa Cvitanic, Xuhu Wan, and Jianfeng Zhang
Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino
Topics
When Stackelberg and Cournot Equilibria Coincide
Luca Colombo and Paola Labrecciosa
Conflict and Consensus: A Theory of Control in Organisations
Priyodorshi Banerjee
Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
Jihui Chen
Identification of Individual Demands from Market Data under Uncertainty
Andres Carvajal and Alvaro Jose Riascos
On the Role of Uncertainty in the Risk-Incentives Tradeoff
Heikki V. Rantakari
On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
Jérome Pouyet, Bernard Salanié, and Francois Salanié
A Duopoly Location Toolkit: Consumer Densities Which Yield Unique Spatial Duopoly Equilibria
Kieron J. Meagher, Ernie G.S. Teo, and Wen Wang
Purchasing Power Parity with Strategic Markets
Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos
Global vs. Local Information in (Anti-)Coordination Problems with Imitators
Leonardo Boncinelli
Research Joint Ventures, Optimal Licensing, and the R&D Subsidy Policy
Cuihong Fan and Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous All-Pay Auctions: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
Rene Kirkegaard
Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening
Daniel Krahmer and Roland Strausz
Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation
Derek J. Clark and Jean-Christophe Pereau
Bidding Strategies for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Michael P. Wellman, Anna Osepayshvili, Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, and Daniel Reeves
Cost Pass-Through under Delegation
Robert A. Ritz