Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly

Hassan Benchekroun, Department of Economics, CIREQ, McGill University
Denis Claude, HEC Montreal & Gerad

A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.

Submitted: May 19, 2006 · Accepted: March 5, 2007 · Published: July 20, 2007

Recommended Citation

Benchekroun, Hassan and Claude, Denis (2007) "Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 26.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1316
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art26

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