Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
A BEJTE Topics article.
Abstract
This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.Submitted: May 19, 2006 · Accepted: March 5, 2007 · Published: July 20, 2007
Recommended Citation
Benchekroun, Hassan and Claude, Denis (2007)
"Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics:
Vol. 7
: Iss. 1
(Topics), Article 26.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art26
