A BEJTE Topics article.

Abstract

We study the agenda selection problem faced by a multi-issue committee when there can be (small) delays between the negotiations of different issues. We show that the presence of these delays affects the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game and solves the indeterminacy of equilibria. In particular, a unique SPE can be established among sequential bargaining procedures. In equilibrium, players discuss the most important issue first.

Submitted: February 26, 2007 · Accepted: April 6, 2007 · Published: May 10, 2007

Recommended Citation

Flamini, Francesca (2007) "Best Agendas in Multi-Issue Bargaining," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 13.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol7/iss1/art13