A BEJTE Contributions article.

Abstract

This paper extends the Downsian-Hotelling model of electoral competition to allow for unobserved qualitative differences between candidates. I show that these underlying qualitative differences generate pure strategy Nash equilibria, even if policies are defined in a multidimensional space, and explain platform divergence from the median. Moreover, the extension gives content to a second (well-known) role elections play apart from bridging conflict: to reveal information about candidates.

Submitted: October 25, 2005 · Accepted: April 1, 2006 · Published: August 23, 2006

Originally published in Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Maravall-Rodriguez, Carlos (2006) "A Spatial Election with Common Values," Contributions to Theoretical Economics: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol6/iss1/art5