A BEJTE Contributions article.

Abstract

This paper investigates the possibility of signal jamming in games with multiple informed parties whose interests are conflicting. The possibility that signal jamming occurs in equilibrium depends on the observability of individual signals. Paradoxically, if the receiver can observe individual signals perfectly, signal jamming can occur in equilibrium, while it cannot occur if the receiver can observe only the one-dimensional signal synthesized from the senders' individual actions.

Submitted: January 24, 2003 · Accepted: September 8, 2003 · Published: November 5, 2003

Originally published in Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Kim, Jeong-Yoo (2003) "Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders," Contributions to Theoretical Economics: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol3/iss1/art7