A BEJTE Contributions article.

Abstract

A one-period, simultaneous-offers bargaining game is analyzed in which, for each player, there is a small probability that his or her proposal will not reach the other player. The unique pure strategy equilibrium offers are identical to those of the Rubinstein (1982) infinite-horizon, alternating-offers bargaining game. This provides a novel interpretation of Rubinstein's result, as well as a new non-cooperative implementation of the Nash Bargaining Solution.

Submitted: September 13, 2002 · Accepted: November 6, 2002 · Published: January 10, 2003

Originally published in Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Evans, Robert (2003) "A One-Period Version of Rubinstein's Bargaining Game," Contributions to Theoretical Economics: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol3/iss1/art2