A BEJTE Contributions article.

Abstract

We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Submitted: March 8, 2002 · Accepted: May 8, 2002 · Published: June 17, 2002

Originally published in Contributions to Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Mailath, George J.; Matthews, Steven A.; and Sekiguchi, Tadashi (2002) "Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Contributions to Theoretical Economics: Vol. 2 : Iss. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/contributions/vol2/iss1/art2