BEJTE Contributions Articles
The Contributions tier publishes articles that make important contributions to specific literatures within theoretical economics; articles that would be suitable for publication in a good field journal or an established general interest journal. The publication rate is 16%.Volume 9 (2009) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Continuous Preferences and Discontinuous Choices: How Altruists Respond to Incentives
Paul B. Seabright
Reputation, Career Concerns, and Job Assignments
Leonardo Martinez
Principal and Expert Agent
James M. Malcomson
Sale of a Deteriorating Asset via Sequential Search
Steven A. Lippman and John W. Mamer
The Efficiency of Observability and Mutual Linkage
Zhiwei Cui, Jian Zhai, and Xuan Liu
A Positive Theory of Income Taxation
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau
Supply Theory sans Profit Maximization
Indraneel Dasgupta
The Dynamics of Collective Reputation
Jonathan Levin
Identifying Community Structures from Network Data via Maximum Likelihood Methods
Jernej Copic, Matthew O. Jackson, and Alan Kirman
Income Distribution, Market Structure, and Individual Welfare
Alexander Tarasov
Free Riding in Combinatorial First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
François Maréchal and Pierre-Henri Morand
Sequential Auctions with Multi-Unit Demands
Gustavo E. Rodriguez
Volume 8 (2008) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games
Jose Penalva and Michael D. Ryall
Forgiving-Proof Equilibrium in Infinitely Repeated Games
Miguel Aramendia, Luis Ruiz, and Quan Wen
A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making
Roland Fryer and Matthew O. Jackson
Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
Jeong-Yoo Kim and Tackseung Jun
Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision
Mattias K. Polborn
Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
Jaksa Cvitanic, Xuhu Wan, and Jianfeng Zhang
Herd Behavior and Contagion in Financial Markets
Marco Cipriani and Antonio Guarino
Volume 7 (2007) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Information Goods Upgrades: Theory and Evidence
V. Brian Viard
Staged Financing with a Variable Return
Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait
A Decentralized Market for a Perishable Good
Ahmed W. Anwar and József Sákovics
Effective Scrappage Subsidies
Susanna Esteban
Sunspot Rational Beliefs Structures, Equilibria and Excess Volatility
Carsten K. Nielsen
Repeated Auctions with the Right of First Refusal
Hayley H. Chouinard and Jonathan K. Yoder
A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
James S. Costain
Bribery and Favoritism by Auctioneers in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Roberto Burguet and Martin K. Perry
When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
Fuhito Kojima
Free Cash Flow and Managerial Entrenchment: A Continuous-Time Stochastic Control-Theoretic Model
Abel Cadenillas and Steven P. Clark
Collective Punishments: Incentives and Examinations in Organisations
Priyodorshi Banerjee
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Set Bridges Time-Preferences to the Nash Solution
Klaus Kultti and Hannu Vartiainen
Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games
Tilman M. Börgers and Timothy McQuade
Contests with Ties
Chen Cohen and Aner Sela
Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure
Arun Sundararajan
Volume 6 (2006) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Snobs and Quality Gaps
Suren Basov
General Option Exercise Rules, with Applications to Embedded Options and Monopolistic Expansion
Svetlana Boyarchenko and Sergei Z. Levendorskii
Liars and Inspectors: Optimal Financial Contracts When Monitoring is Non-Observable
Anna Maria C. Menichini and Peter J. Simmons
A Spatial Election with Common Values
Carlos Maravall-Rodriguez
Is Sustainable Development Compatible with Rawlsian Justice?
Francis E. Raymond
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, and Gwenael Piaser
The Uniqueness of Stable Matchings
Simon Clark
Assessing the Likelihood of Panic-Based Bank Runs
Alexander Zimper
Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical Investigation
Didier G. Laussel
Existence of Equilibrium for Segmented Markets Models with Interest Rate Monetary Policies
Filippo Occhino
Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
Sergio O. Parreiras
Finite Memory Distributed Systems
Victor Dorofeenko and Jamsheed Shorish
Volume 5 (2005) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Utility Equivalence in Auctions
Shlomit Hon-Snir
On the Welfare Evaluation of Income and Opportunity
Antonio Villar
Inefficiency of Collusion at English Auctions
Giuseppe Lopomo, Robert C. Marshall, and Leslie M. Marx
Limited Attention as the Bound on Rationality
Sharon Gifford
Volume 4 (2004) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
To Make or Buy: An Allocation of Attention
Sharon Gifford
Players With Limited Memory
Steffen Huck and Rajiv Sarin
Volume 3 (2003) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Adverse Selection and Insurance Contracting: A Rank-Dependent Utility Analysis
Matthew Joseph Ryan and Rhema Vaithianathan
Incomplete Contracts with Cross-Investments
Sergei Guriev
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information
Ulrich Doraszelski, Dino Gerardi, and Francesco Squintani
Signal Jamming in Games with Multiple Senders
Jeong-Yoo Kim
Homothetic or Cobb-Douglas Behavior Through Aggregation
Gael Giraud and John K.-H. Quah
Volume 2 (2002) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Bargaining over Risky Assets
Muhamet Yildiz
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
George J. Mailath, Steven A. Matthews, and Tadashi Sekiguchi
The Noisy Duopolist
David Spector
Risk Averse Supervisors and the Efficiency of Collusion
Antoine Faure-Grimaud, Jean-Jacques Laffont, and David Martimort
Volume 1 (2001) - Issue 1 (Contributions)
Regulating Endogenous Customer Switching Costs
Joshua S. Gans and Stephen Peter King
Incomplete Contracts. Non-Contractible Quality, and Renegotiation
Christoph Lülfesmann
Bilateral Trade and Opportunism in a Matching Market
Garey Ramey and Joel Watson