A BEJTE Advances article.

Abstract

We study the emergence and nature of long-run behavior of continuous state space dynamics that are subjected to random shocks. It is shown that the fine details of the underlying deterministic dynamics may be crucial in determining the evolution of the system. In particular, a risk dominated strategy can emerge in an evolutionary game subject to symmetric decaying perturbations.

Submitted: June 22, 2005 · Accepted: August 31, 2005 · Published: March 31, 2006

Originally published in Advances in Theoretical Economics.

Recommended Citation

Feinberg, Yossi (2006) "Evolutionary Dynamics and Long-Run Selection," Advances in Theoretical Economics: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol6/iss1/art1