A BEJM Topics article.

Abstract

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.

Submitted: July 25, 2008 · Accepted: July 2, 2009 · Published: July 15, 2009

Recommended Citation

Lindner, Axel (2009) "Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 (Topics), Article 29.
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1690.1801
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol9/iss1/art29