Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games under Uncertainty

Olivier Blanchard, MIT and NBER
Philippe Weil, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ECARES), CEPR and NBER

A BEJM Advances article.

Abstract

In a dynamically efficient economy, can a government roll its debt forever and avoid the need to raise taxes? In a series of examples of economies with zero growth, this paper shows that such Ponzi games may be infeasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is negative, and may be feasible even when the average rate of return on bonds is positive. The paper then reveals the structure which underlies these examples.

Submitted: June 14, 2001 · Accepted: August 16, 2001 · Published: November 27, 2001

Originally published in Advances in Macroeconomics.

Recommended Citation

Blanchard, Olivier and Weil, Philippe (2001) "Dynamic Efficiency, the Riskless Rate, and Debt Ponzi Games under Uncertainty," Advances in Macroeconomics: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejm/advances/vol1/iss2/art3

 
 
 
 

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