The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
A BEJEAP Contributions article.
Abstract
Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.Submitted: March 13, 2003 · Accepted: January 5, 2007 · Published: March 14, 2007
Recommended Citation
Hinloopen, Jeroen
(2007)
"The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements,"
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy:
Vol. 7
: Iss. 1
(Contributions), Article 17.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol7/iss1/art17
