A BEJEAP Topics article.

Abstract

Most studies of competition in health care focus on prices and costs, but concerns about quality play a central role in policy debates. If demand is inelastic to quality, then competition may reduce patient welfare. This study uses a dataset of patient registrations for kidney transplantation in conjunction with a mixed logit model to gauge consumers’ responsiveness to quality when choosing hospitals. Results indicate that at the hospital level, a one-standard deviation increase in the graft-failure rate is associated with a 6% decline in patient registrations. Privately-insured patients are more responsive to quality than Medicare patients, suggesting that insurers consider quality when contracting with providers.

Submitted: August 24, 2004 · Accepted: May 30, 2005 · Published: January 7, 2006

Originally published in Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Howard, David H. (2005) "Quality and Consumer Choice in Healthcare: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1, Article 24.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol5/iss1/art24