A BEJEAP Topics article.

Abstract

Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care.

We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care. The analysis is performed through a series of examples combining different payment schemes at the primary care center and hospital. When hospitals are reimbursed according to costs, prevention efforts are unlikely to occur. However, under a capitation payment for the primary care center and prospective budget for the hospital, prevention efforts increase when shifting from an independent to an integrated management. Also, from a normative standpoint, optimal payment schemes are simpler under joint management.

Submitted: January 30, 2003 · Accepted: July 28, 2003 · Published: August 24, 2003

Originally published in Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Barros, Pedro P. and Martinez-Giralt, Xavier (2003) "Preventive Health Care and Payment Systems," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1, Article 10.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/vol3/iss1/art10