Second-Best Pollution Taxation and Environmental Quality

Thomas Gaube, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

A BEJEAP Frontiers article.

Abstract

This paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available.

Submitted: September 24, 2004 · Accepted: April 4, 2005 · Published: April 12, 2005

Originally published in Frontiers of Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Gaube, Thomas (2005) "Second-Best Pollution Taxation and Environmental Quality," Frontiers of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1, Article 1.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1

 
 
 
 

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