Managed Care and Physician Incentives: The Effects of Competition on the Cost and Quality of Care

David J. Cooper, Case Western Reserve University
James B. Rebitzer, Case Western Reserve University

A BEJEAP Contributions article.

Abstract

We analyze the effect that competition between HMOs has on the cost and quality of medical services. Our key result is that increasing competition enhances consumer utility while also moderating the impact of managed care on quality and costs. Indeed, we find that heightened competition between HMOs can cause an overall increase in care quality and costs. This result derives from an important, but overlooked, feature of the managed care market place. Plans differentiate themselves by the size and depth of their provider network. The resulting competition to attract physicians exerts a moderating effect on the incentive contracts HMOs write with providers.

Submitted: February 8, 2005 · Accepted: April 5, 2006 · Published: July 10, 2006

Originally published in Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy.

Recommended Citation

Cooper, David J. and Rebitzer, James B. (2006) "Managed Care and Physician Incentives: The Effects of Competition on the Cost and Quality of Care," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 5 : Iss. 1, Article 16.
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol5/iss1/art16

 
 
 
 

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